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Le « Made in Benin » poursuit son expansion sur le territoire national. Après son implantation à Cotonou, la marque béninoise de linge de maison SùSù renforce sa présence avec l'ouverture officielle de son deuxième showroom à Parakou, dans le département du Borgou.

La société Bénin Textile SA (Btex) et son distributeur agréé DIXTRI Textile, offrent la possibilité aux populations de Parakou, dans le Nord-Bénin, de se procurer la marque béninoise de linge de maison SùSù. Un showroom a été ouvert le vendredi 26 juin 2026, marquant ainsi une étape importante dans la stratégie de déploiement national de la marque. La cérémonie s'est déroulée en présence du chef du 3ᵉ arrondissement de Parakou ainsi que du représentant du maire, qui ont salué une initiative contribuant à la valorisation de la production locale.

Fabriqués au sein de la Zone industrielle de Glo-Djigbé (GDIZ), les produits SùSù sont entièrement conçus au Bénin. La marque propose une large gamme de linge de maison destinée à répondre aux besoins des ménages, avec une offre alliant qualité, confort et savoir-faire local.
À travers cette nouvelle implantation, Bénin Textile SA entend d'une part, rapprocher les produits fabriqués localement des consommateurs du septentrion, et d'autre part, promouvoir davantage la consommation des produits « Made in Benin ». Pour l'entreprise, le choix de Parakou s'inscrit dans une vision d'inclusion économique et de développement du marché national.
« Parakou n'est pas un hasard. C'est un choix. Celui d'une marque qui croit que chaque ville, chaque foyer, chaque famille du Bénin mérite d'accéder à des produits de qualité, fabriqués ici, par nous, pour nous », a souligné le représentant de Bénin Textile SA lors de la cérémonie d'ouverture du showroom.
Avec cette nouvelle ouverture, SùSù confirme son ambition de rendre les produits textiles béninois plus accessibles et de renforcer la présence du Made in Benin dans le quotidien des consommateurs.
Le nouveau showroom est situé au rond-point Aérodrome, en face du restaurant La Vieille Marmite, dans le quartier Wanssirou.

F. A. A.

Acht Staaten, unzählige indigene Völker, rivalisierende Großmächte: Die Arktis ist Heimat, Klimaindikator, Ressourcenreservoir und geopolitisches Terrain zugleich. Vor allem aber ist sie keine klar umrissene Region, sondern eine Projektionsfläche - geprägt von konkurrierenden Interessen, Narrativen und der Frage, wessen Stimme zählt.

Acht Staaten, unzählige indigene Völker, rivalisierende Großmächte: Die Arktis ist Heimat, Klimaindikator, Ressourcenreservoir und geopolitisches Terrain zugleich. Vor allem aber ist sie keine klar umrissene Region, sondern eine Projektionsfläche - geprägt von konkurrierenden Interessen, Narrativen und der Frage, wessen Stimme zählt.

Acht Staaten, unzählige indigene Völker, rivalisierende Großmächte: Die Arktis ist Heimat, Klimaindikator, Ressourcenreservoir und geopolitisches Terrain zugleich. Vor allem aber ist sie keine klar umrissene Region, sondern eine Projektionsfläche - geprägt von konkurrierenden Interessen, Narrativen und der Frage, wessen Stimme zählt.

Aerial view of the Port of Dubai Emirate located in Jebel Ali district, Dubai, United Arab Emirates. Credit: WikiMedia/Imre Solt

By Maximilian Malawista
UNITED NATIONS, Jul 14 2026 (IPS)

Despite the importance of international trade as an engine for economic growth and development, only fourteen of the twenty-two Arab states are members of the World Trade Organization (WTO). The remaining Arab states risk missing out on opportunities for greater integration into the global economy and the multilateral trading system facilitated by the WTO.

A new joint study produced by the WTO, the Arab Monetary Fund, the Islamic Development Bank, and the Islamic Centre for Development of Trade examines the benefits of WTO membership, the barriers facing Arab states seeking accession and the economic characteristics which define the region.

According to the publication, WTO membership has “facilitated and secured significant export opportunities in the markets of other WTO members,” while also developing “competitive market conditions and a business-friendly environment.” Membership can create the predictability and stability needed to attract foreign direct investment, while encouraging economic diversification and supporting regulatory reform.

The potential benefits of WTO membership can also be reflected by logistics performance of Arab economies. According to the World Bank’s 2023 Logistics Performance Index, Arab members of the WTO generally outperform non-member economies across infrastructure, international shipments, logistics competence, and other logistics related sectors.

The Index recorded that Arab WTO members had an average logistics score of 3.17 compared to an average of 2.25 among non-member states. The United Arab Emirates (UAE) ranked the highest among Arab economies with a score of 4.0. In contrast, non-member states such as Somalia and Libya received scores of 2.0 and 1.9.

Source: Author’s visualizations using data from International Logistics Performance Index (LPI) 2023, World Bank Group

Despite the potential benefits of WTO membership, WTO accession has proven to be a lengthy process for Arab states. Seven countries seeking membership — Algeria, Iraq, Lebanon, Somalia, Sudan, Libya, and Syria — have been engaged in accession processes for an average of 18 or more years, with negotiations for some countries remaining inactive for extended periods.

The report attributed these delays to a combination of institutional challenges, political instability and economic turmoil. Political instability and conflict have especially disrupted investment and infrastructure which has halted much needed development across parts of the region, while weak regulatory frameworks have complicated efforts to align national policies with WTO requirements.

For accession to occur, it requires extensive legal and institutional reforms, coordination among regulatory agencies and ministries, and sustained political commitment throughout the years of negotiations. The report identifies the history of centrally planned economies as one of the defining characteristics which has complicated accession for some Arab states.

“An inevitable consequence of this history was the limited experience gained in regulating and governing a competitive private sector-led economy.” the report states. “A transformation from a centrally planned economy to a market economy model normally requires a fundamental shift in the government’s role from being a producer to becoming a regulator.”

These challenges are further complicated by the considerable economic differences among the Arab economies seeking integration within the global trading system.

Dependence on oil and gas for exports remains particularly significant. In 2020, 97 percent of Iraq’s total exports and 95 percent of both Algeria and Libya’s exports were fuel, all three of which are seeking WTO membership. The report argues that this dependence leaves economies vulnerable to fluctuations in global commodity markets and calls for greater economic diversification.

Economic disparities in the region can also be seen through merchandise trade composition. During 2022, Saudi Arabia had recorded a merchandise trade surplus of USD 221.3 billion, followed by the UAE at USD 112.3 billion and Qatar at USD 97.5 billion. Egypt on the other hand recorded a USD 37 billion trade deficit, while Morocco and Lebanon recorded deficits of USD 30.3 billion and USD 15.1 billion, reflecting their respective trade.

These trade compositions highlight the vastly different economic characteristics between Arab states and how they partake in the global trading system. Several of the region’s largest commodity exporters depend heavily on oil and gas, including Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Oman, Kuwait, Iraq, Algeria, and Libya. Other Arab economies such as Egypt, Jordan, Tunisia, Morocco, and Lebanon, have smaller hydrocarbon sectors and greater dependence on imported goods.

These structural differences alongside varying levels of political stability and institutional capacity, mean that strategies for greater integration into the global trade system cannot be uniform. The report argues that WTO accession strategies must instead be tailored to individual economic and institutional circumstances of each country.

Although the Arab states might differ in how they trade, trade remains central to the region’s economic engine, accounting for 87 percent of GDP across the Arab economies in 2023. Intra-Arab trade on the other hand only accounted only for 9.9 percent of total exports, while intra-Arab imports represented 12.1 percent of total imports during the same period.

International organizations have sought to address some of the barriers facing countries seeking WTO membership. In Iraq, the European Union (EU) funded “strengthening the Agriculture and Agri-Food Value Chain and Improving Trade Policy project” (SAAVI) which has provided aid to Iraq’s WTO accession. SAAVI aims to align Iraq’s trade policies and international standards with the WTO framework through technical assistance, capacity building, and advisory services.

The report argues that greater involvement in the multilateral trading system can greatly support economic diversification and further integrate Arab economies into global value and supply chains. Especially when looking at the model of the gulf countries, where vital energy, petrochemicals, and metals have become nonnegotiable parts of the international trade system. However the report indicated that WTO membership alone cannot guarantee these outcomes. For the seven Arab states seeking accession, strengthening regulatory institutions, improving coordination across government agencies and maintaining sustained political commitment will be critical to advancing accession processes that have already lasted an average of more than 18 years.

IPS UN Bureau Report

 

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By Anis Chowdhury
SYDNEY, Jul 14 2026 (IPS)

Philippines was the most advanced Southeast Asian country with the highest per capita GDP until about the early 1960s. Its per capita GDP in purchasing power parity terms were about the same as South Korea’s and above that of Thailand in the early 1970s.The Nobel Laureate economist, Gunnar Myrdal, did not have much hope for “disease infested” Indonesia when in 1968 he published his famous Asian Drama: An Enquiry Into the Poverty of Nations. But Indonesia surged ahead since the late 1960s with growth acceleration exceeding that of Philippines; thus, eventually overtaking Philippines in GDP per capita in the mid-1980s. What factors separated Indonesia from Philippines?

Elite Stake

It has been the elite stake in the country that played the critical role. The Indonesian elite put their trust in the country, whereas the Filipino elite began to think that their future was in the United States (US). Incidentally, this coincided with President Ferdinand Marcos’ turning into a despot by imposing martial law in 1972 and embracing a policy of “constitutional authoritarianism”.

Anis Chowdhury

The Indonesian elite built the national system, e.g., reasonably well-resourced public health and education facilities. On the other hand, the Filipino elite took their money to the US. For example, over 52 years (1960-2011), an estimated US$133 billion was taken out of Philippines illicitly primarily through trade mis-invoicing. Estimates have consistently ranked Philippines among the top 20 countries with the highest illicit flow of funds (IFFs) worldwide.

It does not mean that IFFs do not occur in Indonesia. In recent years, IFFs have become a major concern for Indonesia; however, there the main actors are multinational corporations, especially in the mining sector. The mining sector in Indonesia accounted for 10.5% of total of IFFs out of Indonesia.

The difference is in the scale and actors.

Good governance myth

Poor governance, especially corruption, is seen as a critical barrier to development. However, the Philippines and Indonesia tale casts doubt on the “good governance” thesis.

Indonesia ranks 109th out of 180 countries in the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), while Philippines ranks 120th. Although Philippines is placed at a lower place than Indonesia, corruption is endemic in both countries and the scale is not much different.

However, the difference is where the ill-gotten money is being invested. Without condoning corruption, the tale of these two countries implies that if the ill-gotten money is invested domestically instead of siphoned-off, the country will experience a better development outcome. One can call this “patriotic” corruption as a means of primitive capital accumulation. Where the corrupt money is siphoned-off, corruption is “predatory” analogous to colonial plundering.

Bangladesh is a glaring example of predatory corruption. A 2011 UNDP report ranked Bangladesh no 1 among least developed countries in IFFs. Between 1990 and 2008 the cumulative illicit outflow of funds from Bangladesh was estimated at US$34.8 billion. An estimated US$234 billion was plundered from Bangladesh during Sheikh Hasina’s 15-year autocratic reign.

Authoritarianism debunked

The East Asian development success created a perception, codified in the “Lee hypothesis”, that authoritarian regimes deliver better development outcomes than democracies. Sheikh Hasina, like many other despots, used this argument to consolidate her autocratic rule by brutal suppression of human and democratic rights.

As highlighted earlier, in the case of Indonesia, the elite displayed trust in the country, while in the case of Philippines and Bangladesh, the elite plundered to siphon-off with the aid of repressive kleptocratic regimes.

At the end, however, all three autocratic regimes collapsed; but rebuilding the trust and elite stake in the country remains a challenge in plundered countries like Philippines and Bangladesh.

Anna Karenina principle

Leo Tolstoy in his 1877 novel, Anna Karenina, laid down the Anna Karenina principle: “All happy families are alike; each unhappy family is unhappy in its own way”. The Anna Karenina principle implies that a deficiency in any one of several critical factors dooms a complex endeavour to failure even if all other essential factors are present. In technical jargons, they constitute the “sufficient” condition for the “necessary condition” to work.

Both Indonesia and Philippines share many common factors – they are both archipelago consisting of thousands of small islands dispersed over vast areas of the South China Sea like a garland. They are ethnically diverse; while Indonesia is a Muslim majority country, Catholics dominate in Philippines. Both faiths are regarded as un-worldly, focusing more on the hereafter compared with the Protestant ethics, which is more conducive for capitalism to flourish. Both countries also experienced ethnic separatist armed conflicts.

Both Indonesia and Philippines had pro-US regimes, and the two countries witnessed repressive autocratic rules lasting for decades. Both pro-US regimes also received large US aid and access to the US market as well as foreign direct investment.

Yet their development experiences have differed.

The missing factor is elite stake, the glue to hold all other essential conducive factors together.

Anis Chowdhury, Emeritus Professor, Western Sydney University (Australia). He held senior UN positions in Bangkok and New York and served as Special Assistant to the Chief Advisor for Finance (with the status and rank of State Minister) in the Professor Yunus-led Interim Government. Anis has written extensively on East and Southeast Asian economies, including The Newly Industrialising Economies of East Asia (Routledge) and The Political Economy of East Asia (Oxford University Press). E-mail: anis.z.chowdhury@gmail.com; a.chowdhury@westernsydney.edu.au

IPS UN Bureau

 

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Les députés ont approuvé, le 10 juillet 2026, l'accord de financement conclu entre le gouvernement béninois et l'Agence Française de Développement (AFD) dans le cadre du projet de Musée d'art contemporain de Cotonou (MACC).

Après les projets muséaux lancés à Ouidah, Porto-Novo et Abomey, Cotonou s'apprête à accueillir un musée consacré à l'art contemporain, dont le financement a été entériné, vendredi 10 juillet 2026, par l'Assemblée nationale.

Le financement de l'Agence Française de Développement (AFD), comprend un prêt de 25 millions d'euros et une subvention de 5 millions d'euros, soit près de 19,7 milliards de FCFA.

Il couvrira la construction du Musée d'art contemporain de Cotonou (MACC), la conception de son parcours muséal, son lancement ainsi que des actions de formation au profit des professionnels du secteur culturel.

Le futur établissement s'inscrit dans la politique de valorisation du patrimoine culturel engagée par le gouvernement depuis 2016.

Lors des débats parlementaires, plusieurs députés ont appelé à une forte implication des entreprises et de la main-d'œuvre nationales afin que les retombées économiques bénéficient pleinement au pays. Ils ont également insisté sur la nécessité d'un suivi rigoureux de l'exécution du projet.

Pour le ministre de la Culture, des Arts et du Patrimoine, Yassine Latoundji, le MACC constitue un levier de développement économique autant qu'un équipement culturel. Selon lui, le projet doit stimuler les industries culturelles et créatives, favoriser la création d'emplois et accroître la visibilité des artistes béninois et africains grâce à un partenariat de long terme avec l'AFD.
M. M.

La Cour constitutionnelle a ouvert, lundi 13 juillet 2026 à Grand-Popo, un séminaire consacré à l'évaluation de l'élection présidentielle d'avril 2026.

Pendant plusieurs jours, conseillers, cadres, assistants juridiques et rapporteurs adjoints à la Cour constitutionnelle passeront en revue le déroulement de l'élection présidentiel d'avril dernier.

Présidant la cérémonie d'ouverture, lundi 13 juillet 2026 à Grand-Popo, au nom du président de l'institution, empêché, le vice-président, Nicolas Assogba, a rappelé que la Cour est investie par la Constitution de la mission de veiller à la régularité de l'élection présidentielle, de connaître du contentieux électoral et de proclamer les résultats définitifs.

Il a salué le travail accompli par la haute juridiction tout au long du processus électoral, depuis l'examen des candidatures jusqu'à la proclamation des résultats et à la prestation de serment du président élu le 24 mai, en passant par le suivi des opérations de vote et le traitement des recours. Selon lui, ces différentes missions ont contribué à la transparence du scrutin et au renforcement de la confiance dans les institutions.

Le séminaire doit permettre d'identifier les points forts et les insuffisances du processus, de formuler des recommandations et de définir des outils destinés à améliorer l'organisation des futures consultations électorales.

Le secrétaire général de la Cour, Romuald Irotori, a indiqué que les participants travailleront également à l'élaboration d'une première version d'un manuel des procédures. Ce document, appelé à être enrichi puis adopté, doit servir de référence pour les futures interventions de la haute juridiction en matière électorale.

La première journée a été marquée par plusieurs communications techniques suivies de débats entre les participants.

Les travaux se poursuivent ce mardi avec de nouvelles sessions consacrées à la consolidation des recommandations issues des échanges.
M. M.

L'Assemblée nationale a adopté à l'unanimité, lundi 13 juillet, une nouvelle loi encadrant la protection de l'environnement au Bénin.

La loi n°2026-15 portant protection de l'environnement a été adoptée ce lundi 13 juillet 2026 par les députés. Le texte remplace la loi-cadre en vigueur depuis 1999 afin d'adapter la législation aux nouveaux défis environnementaux et aux engagements internationaux.

La réforme fixe un cadre juridique plus actuel pour la prévention des pollutions, la préservation des ressources naturelles, l'évaluation des impacts environnementaux ainsi que la répression des infractions.

Elle prévoit également une implication accrue des collectivités territoriales, du secteur privé et des organisations de la société civile dans la gouvernance environnementale.

Composé de 138 articles, le nouveau dispositif harmonise aussi les règles avec plusieurs textes en vigueur, notamment le Code pénal, le Code d'hygiène publique et d'autres lois sectorielles. Il intègre également les conventions internationales ratifiées par le Bénin en matière de protection de l'environnement.

L'une des principales nouveautés concerne le renforcement des sanctions. Selon la gravité des faits, les contrevenants s'exposent à des amendes allant de 50 000 FCFA à 10 milliards FCFA, ainsi qu'à des peines pouvant atteindre 20 ans de réclusion criminelle.

Au cours des débats, plusieurs députés ont plaidé pour une large vulgarisation de la loi, notamment dans les langues nationales. Ils ont aussi souhaité que les procédures d'obtention des certificats de conformité environnementale soient simplifiées et que l'application des nouvelles dispositions ne fragilise pas les petites et moyennes entreprises.

Présent au nom du gouvernement, le ministre de la Justice et de la Législation, Yvon Détchénou, a assuré que les évolutions prévues par la réforme ne remettent pas en cause l'existence des structures intervenant dans la gestion environnementale, même si leur organisation ou leur appellation pourraient évoluer.

M. M.

A conceptual illustration of the Global Nobel Laureates Assembly at Castel Gandolfo, where Nobel laureates, AI experts, religious leaders and civil society representatives will confront the intertwined risks of artificial intelligence, nuclear weapons and war while seeking a new architecture for peace. Credit: INPS Japan

By Katsuhiro Asagiri
VATICAN CITY, Jul 13 2026 (IPS)

More than eight decades after the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki ushered humanity into the nuclear age, the world is confronting another technological revolution whose consequences extend far beyond science and industry.

Global Nobel Laureates Assembly on AI and Nuclear War

Nuclear weapons still possess the capacity to destroy civilization within hours. At the same time, artificial intelligence is transforming military planning, intelligence gathering, cyber operations and strategic decision-making in ways that the institutions established after World War II were never designed to govern.

Against this backdrop, more than 200 participants — including around 30 Nobel laureates and representatives of Nobel Prize-winning organizations, former heads of state and government, leading artificial intelligence researchers, scientists, Catholic figures and civil society representatives — are set to gather from July 14 to 16 at Borgo Laudato Si’ in the Pontifical Gardens of Castel Gandolfo.

The Global Nobel Laureates Assembly on Artificial Intelligence and Nuclear War will bring together some of the world’s most prominent voices in science, technology, peacebuilding and ethics to consider one of the defining questions of the twenty-first century:

Can artificial intelligence become a force for peace, or will it deepen the dangers of war in an already unstable nuclear age?

The three-day gathering will conclude in Rome on July 16 with the presentation of the Rome Declaration for an Unarmed and Disarming Peace, intended to set out principles and recommendations for addressing artificial intelligence, nuclear weapons, autonomous weapons, digital governance and emerging models of technological development.

Source: Progressive Hub

A World at a Strategic Crossroads

The timing of the Assembly is no coincidence.

The international security environment has become increasingly fragile. Russia’s war in Ukraine has shaken Europe’s post-Cold War security order. Conflicts in the Middle East have heightened fears of wider regional escalation. Relations among the major powers have deteriorated, while nuclear rhetoric has returned to international politics with an intensity not seen for decades.

At the same time, all nine nuclear-armed states are modernizing or expanding their arsenals. Many of the arms-control arrangements that once helped manage strategic rivalry have weakened, expired or become politically paralyzed. Channels of communication among adversaries have narrowed, increasing the danger of misunderstanding and miscalculation.

Artificial intelligence is entering this volatile environment at extraordinary speed.

AI systems can already process vast quantities of intelligence, identify patterns, assist military planning, strengthen cyber capabilities and accelerate decisions that once required hours or days of human deliberation. They may eventually provide new tools for crisis prevention, verification and early warning.

But those same capabilities could also make crises more dangerous.

Artificial intelligence may shorten the time available to political and military leaders during emergencies. It may generate unreliable or misleading assessments, magnify disinformation, increase the vulnerability of command systems to cyberattacks and encourage states to delegate more authority to automated technologies.

A conceptual illustration of world leaders confronting the growing influence of artificial intelligence on military power and nuclear decision-making, as technological advances threaten to outpace political judgment and international governance. Credit: INPS Japan

The central concern is not necessarily that a machine will independently decide to launch a nuclear weapon. The more immediate danger is that AI-generated information, predictions or recommendations could influence human decision-makers during moments of extreme pressure, when information is incomplete and the consequences of error are irreversible.

Humanity is therefore confronting a challenge unlike any it has faced before.

The question is no longer simply how nuclear weapons should be controlled. It is also how the relationship between artificial intelligence, military power and nuclear decision-making should be governed before technological developments outpace political judgment.

Pope Leo XIV, photographed in October 2025 during an audience with President of Brazil Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva in the Vatican Credit: Wikimedia Commons

Why the Vatican?

The choice of the Vatican as host is deeply symbolic.

The Holy See commands no nuclear arsenal and exercises little conventional military power. Yet it maintains diplomatic relations with most of the world’s states and has long sought to place human dignity, moral responsibility and the protection of civilians at the center of debates about war and peace.

The Assembly is being held at Borgo Laudato Si’, an educational and ecological center established in the gardens of the papal residence at Castel Gandolfo. According to the organizers, the meeting is inspired by Pope Leo XIV’s encyclical Magnifica humanitas, devoted to the protection of the human person in the age of artificial intelligence.

Its guiding vision — an “Unarmed and Disarming Peace” — suggests a concept of peace that goes beyond the absence of war.

An unarmed peace rejects the assumption that security can be permanently sustained through ever-greater military force. A disarming peace seeks not only the reduction of weapons but also the transformation of the political fears, rivalries and economic structures that perpetuate militarization.

This approach broadens the discussion beyond questions of technological safety.

It asks what kind of society humanity wishes to build as increasingly powerful systems reshape politics, economics, communication and warfare. It also raises a deeper ethical question: whether innovation will remain subordinate to human dignity, or whether human beings will gradually be subordinated to the technologies they create.

Beyond Governments

Perhaps the Assembly’s most significant feature is its recognition that governments alone can no longer govern all the technologies shaping the future.

During the Cold War, nuclear diplomacy belonged primarily to states. Agreements such as the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty were negotiated among governments because states controlled nuclear arsenals, delivery systems and the materials needed to build them.

Artificial intelligence presents a fundamentally different reality.

Many of the world’s most advanced AI systems are being developed by private companies, universities and research laboratories. Technology firms possess computing resources, data and specialized expertise that rival or exceed the capacities of many governments. Decisions made inside corporate research divisions can have global political, social and security consequences.

Effective governance will therefore require more than traditional diplomacy.

It will require sustained cooperation among states, technology companies, scientists, universities, international institutions, religious communities and civil society.

That is precisely why the Assembly will bring together Nobel laureates, AI companies, leading universities and research institutions, nuclear disarmament organizations, Catholic figures centered around the Vatican, and civil society organizations, including Soka Gakkai, a Buddhist-based movement engaged in peacebuilding, dialogue and nuclear abolition.

Global Nobel Laureates Assembly on Artificial Intelligence and Nuclear War

Participants and supporting institutions include representatives associated with OpenAI, Google DeepMind, Anthropic and AARU, as well as the Nobel Women’s Initiative, International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs, the Yunus Center and the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists.

Universities and research institutions from Europe, Asia, North America and Australia are also expected to take part.

The significance of this gathering lies not simply in the prominence of those attending, but in the diversity of the communities represented.

Instead of relying exclusively on governments, the Assembly reflects an emerging model of global governance in which science, technology, ethics, religion and civil society seek common ground in addressing shared existential risks.

From Warheads to Algorithms

For much of the nuclear age, arms-control negotiations focused on physical objects: warheads, missiles, bombers, submarines, nuclear materials and testing facilities.

The AI age introduces a different set of challenges.

Algorithms are less visible than missiles. Software can be modified rapidly. Data can cross national borders almost instantaneously. Commercial systems developed for peaceful purposes can also have military applications. Verification, accountability and transparency become far more difficult when the relevant technologies are embedded in code, networks and privately controlled computing infrastructure.

This means that future arms-control and security frameworks may need to govern not only weapons but also the digital systems that inform, guide or accelerate their use.

Questions that once appeared theoretical are becoming increasingly urgent.

Should artificial intelligence ever be integrated into nuclear command-and-control systems? What level of human oversight must be maintained over autonomous weapons? How should states respond when AI systems produce conflicting warnings during a crisis? Can private technology companies be held accountable when their products are adapted for military purposes? And what international institutions are capable of establishing credible safeguards?

The Assembly cannot resolve all these questions in three days.

But by placing nuclear experts, Nobel laureates, AI developers, scholars, religious figures and peace advocates in the same forum, it may help establish a common vocabulary for debates that have until now often taken place in isolation from one another.

The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, signed 20 September 2017 by 50 United Nations member states. Credit: UN Photo / Paulo Filgueiras

A New Chapter in Global Governance?

History suggests that humanity has repeatedly responded to existential threats by creating new ideas, institutions and norms.

The Russell-Einstein Manifesto of 1955 warned that nuclear weapons had placed the survival of the human species in jeopardy. The first Pugwash Conference in 1957 opened channels of communication among scientists divided by the Cold War. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty later became the central framework of the international nuclear order.

The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, adopted in 2017, further strengthened the humanitarian and moral challenge to nuclear deterrence by declaring nuclear weapons incompatible with international humanitarian principles.

Whether the Global Nobel Laureates Assembly will eventually be regarded as part of that historical lineage remains uncertain.

Declarations issued at international conferences rarely transform policy overnight. They may lack legal force, enforcement mechanisms or immediate political support. Their language can be aspirational, and their influence may not become visible for years.

Yet declarations can also change the terms of international debate.

The Russell-Einstein Manifesto did not eliminate nuclear weapons, but it helped inspire a movement. The first Pugwash meeting did not end the Cold War, but it established relationships that later contributed to arms-control diplomacy. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights was not initially binding, yet it became a foundational reference for international law and political legitimacy.

The importance of the Rome Declaration may therefore depend less on whether it produces immediate agreements than on whether it begins a sustained process involving governments, technology companies, universities, international organizations and civil society.

The larger question is whether it can help create norms before dangerous practices become entrenched.

Looking Toward the Rome Declaration

Palazzo Senatorio　Credit: Di Tournasol7 – Opera propria, CC BY-SA 4.0

The Assembly will culminate on July 16 with a formal session at the Capitoline Hill in Rome, where the Rome Declaration for an Unarmed and Disarming Peace is expected to be presented.

The document is intended to address the age of artificial intelligence, nuclear and autonomous weapons, new digital protocols and emerging models of digital development. According to the organizers, it will seek to promote international security based on cooperation, human dignity, integral development and peace among peoples.

The critical test will be whether the Declaration moves beyond broad ethical appeals.

Will it call for meaningful human control over nuclear and autonomous weapons systems? Will it propose restrictions on the role of AI in nuclear decision-making? Will it outline responsibilities for private AI companies? Will it recommend new international monitoring, dialogue or verification mechanisms? And will it establish a continuing process capable of translating principles into policy?

The answers will determine whether the meeting remains primarily symbolic or becomes the starting point of a broader “Rome Process” on artificial intelligence, nuclear risk and human security.

More than eight decades after Hiroshima and Nagasaki, humanity once again faces technologies capable of reshaping the future of civilization.

Nuclear weapons remain the most immediate means by which human beings could destroy their own societies. Artificial intelligence, meanwhile, is beginning to influence the speed, complexity and character of the decisions that could determine whether those weapons are ever used.

The defining challenge is therefore no longer simply whether humanity can control nuclear arms.

It is whether humanity can build institutions capable of ensuring that artificial intelligence strengthens human judgment rather than displacing it, reduces the danger of catastrophic error rather than magnifying it, and serves peace rather than war.

The answer will not emerge from three days of deliberation at Castel Gandolfo.

But the conversation beginning there may help shape international debates over technology, security and human responsibility for years to come.

Credit: UN photo

INPS Japan will report from Castel Gandolfo and Rome during the Assembly and will publish follow-up analysis after the Rome Declaration is presented on July 16. This article is brought to you by INPS Japan in collaboration with Soka Gakkai International in consultative status with UN ECOSOC.

 

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Alors que Bamako annonçait un renforcement de son dispositif sécuritaire, un convoi des Forces armées maliennes est tombé dans une embuscade dans le centre du pays. Une nouvelle attaque qui illustre la capacité des groupes armés à frapper les axes logistiques stratégiques et à maintenir une forte pression sur les FAMa.

Une nouvelle attaque contre un convoi militaire

La violence ne faiblit pas au Mali. Dimanche 12 juillet, un convoi des Forces armées maliennes (FAMa) a été attaqué dans le centre du pays alors qu'il assurait une mission de ravitaillement entre plusieurs camps militaires. Selon plusieurs sources sécuritaires, l'embuscade s'est produite sur l'axe reliant Niono à Nampala, une zone régulièrement ciblée par les groupes armés. Des échanges de tirs nourris ont opposé les militaires aux assaillants. Plusieurs véhicules auraient été incendiés, des équipements militaires saisis et des soldats tués ou blessés. Les autorités maliennes n'ont toutefois pas publié de bilan officiel au moment de la rédaction de cet article. Cette attaque intervient après le passage de deux convois logistiques destinés à ravitailler différentes positions militaires dans le centre du pays, illustrant les difficultés persistantes des FAMa à sécuriser les axes routiers stratégiques.

Le GSIM poursuit sa stratégie d'usure

L'embuscade est attribuée au Groupe de soutien à l'islam et aux musulmans (GSIM), organisation affiliée à Al-Qaida et considérée comme l'un des principaux acteurs de l'insurrection au Sahel.Depuis plusieurs mois, le mouvement multiplie les attaques coordonnées contre les convois militaires, les camps et les infrastructures de transport. Cette tactique vise moins à conquérir durablement des territoires qu'à affaiblir progressivement les capacités logistiques de l'armée, perturber les ravitaillements et maintenir une pression constante sur les forces gouvernementales. En ciblant les convois, les groupes armés cherchent également à récupérer des armes, des munitions et des véhicules, ressources essentielles pour poursuivre leurs opérations.

Une menace qui s'étend du nord au centre du pays

Cette nouvelle embuscade s'inscrit dans une séquence sécuritaire particulièrement tendue. Début juillet, plusieurs positions militaires ont été visées simultanément dans le nord et le centre du Mali. La localité d'Anéfis, verrou stratégique situé sur l'axe reliant Gao à Kidal, a notamment été la cible d'une attaque, tout comme plusieurs positions à Gao et à Sévaré. La prison de Kéniéroba, à une soixantaine de kilomètres de Bamako, a également été prise pour cible.

La simultanéité de ces offensives illustre une stratégie visant à disperser les capacités de réaction des Forces armées maliennes (FAMa) en ouvrant plusieurs fronts à la fois. Si l'armée affirme avoir repris le contrôle de la situation sur différents secteurs, la multiplication de ces attaques témoigne de la capacité des groupes armés à coordonner leurs opérations et à maintenir une forte pression sur le dispositif sécuritaire malien.

Un défi sécuritaire loin d'être résolu

Le retrait des forces françaises puis de la Mission multidimensionnelle intégrée des Nations unies pour la stabilisation au Mali (MINUSMA) a profondément rebattu les cartes de la lutte contre les groupes armés. Désormais, Bamako s'appuie sur les Forces armées maliennes (FAMa), soutenues par les instructeurs et combattants de l'Africa Corps, qui a succédé au groupe Wagner. Malgré ce changement de doctrine et les opérations menées ces derniers mois, les attaques récentes montrent que les groupes jihadistes conservent une importante capacité d'initiative. Mobiles et flexibles, ils adaptent leurs modes opératoires, privilégient les embuscades contre les convois logistiques et ciblent les axes de ravitaillement, essentiels au déploiement des forces gouvernementales. Cette stratégie d'usure met en évidence les difficultés persistantes des autorités à sécuriser durablement les principales voies de communication. Au-delà des victoires tactiques revendiquées par l'armée, la liberté de mouvement des groupes armés continue de poser un défi majeur à l'État malien sur plusieurs fronts.

Le Tribunal de commerce de Cotonou a condamné, le 25 juin 2026, PROXIMITY GROUP AFRICA SA à payer 23.399.298 FCFA à STRALIX SARL.

L'émission d'un ordre de virement bancaire ne suffit pas, à elle seule, à éteindre une dette. Encore faut-il que les fonds parviennent effectivement au bénéficiaire. C'est le principe qu'a rappelé le Tribunal de commerce de Cotonou dans son jugement n°057/2026/CJ1/S2/TCC du 25 juin 2026, rendu dans un litige opposant STRALIX SARL à PROXIMITY GROUP AFRICA SA.

L'affaire trouve son origine dans l'exécution de prestations réalisées par STRALIX pour la succursale guinéenne de PROXIMITY GROUP AFRICA dans le cadre d'un marché conclu avec ECOBANK Guinée. Une facture n°0117-AG-SC-ST-25, émise le 8 décembre 2025, d'un montant de 36.672 euros, soit 23.399.298 FCFA, demeure impayée.

Pour régler cette créance, PROXIMITY GROUP AFRICA affirme avoir initié, le 17 décembre 2025, un virement international depuis son compte domicilié chez ECOBANK Guinée. Son compte aurait bien été débité. Mais plusieurs mois plus tard, STRALIX assure n'avoir reçu aucun paiement.

Selon PROXIMITY GROUP AFRICA, sa banque lui aurait indiqué que le virement avait été rejeté par la BIIC avant d'être retourné. La banque béninoise soutient au contraire n'avoir jamais reçu les fonds.

Face à cette situation, STRALIX assigne, le 27 mars 2026, PROXIMITY GROUP AFRICA, ECOBANK Guinée et la BIIC devant le Tribunal de commerce de Cotonou. Elle réclame le paiement de sa facture, 400 millions FCFA de dommages-intérêts ainsi que des frais irrépétibles.

En défense, PROXIMITY GROUP AFRICA reconnaît devoir la somme réclamée mais estime s'être libérée de son obligation dès lors que le virement a été ordonné et que son compte a été débité. Elle demande que la responsabilité soit transférée à ECOBANK Guinée.

Pour le Tribunal, « le virement international initié, le 17 décembre 2025 (...) n'a pu atteindre la société STRALIX SARL » et « la BIIC SA n'a pas non plus reçu les fonds ».

La juridiction ajoute que « les raisons pour lesquelles la société ECOBANK Guinée SA n'a pas exécuté l'ordre de virement ne sont pas connues de la juridiction de céans », ce qui ne permet pas d'apprécier la responsabilité de cette banque dans l'échec de l'opération.

S'appuyant sur l'article 1315 du Code civil, le Tribunal rappelle que « celui qui réclame l'exécution d'une obligation doit la prouver. Réciproquement, celui qui se prétend libéré doit justifier le paiement ». Les magistrats en déduisent que, STRALIX n'ayant jamais reçu les fonds, « c'est à bon droit qu'elle en sollicite le paiement ».

En conséquence, PROXIMITY GROUP AFRICA est condamnée à payer à STRALIX 36.672 euros, soit 23.399.298 FCFA, correspondant à la facture impayée.

Le Tribunal a rejeté la demande de 400 millions FCFA de dommages-intérêts formulée par STRALIX. Il considère que PROXIMITY GROUP AFRICA « a manifesté sa bonne foi en effectuant un ordre de virement » et que le préjudice invoqué ne se distingue pas de celui résultant du simple non-paiement de la créance.

Les juges déboutent également PROXIMITY GROUP AFRICA de sa demande de 50 millions FCFA de dommages-intérêts contre ECOBANK Guinée, estimant que les pièces du dossier montrent que les fonds ont finalement été recrédités sur son compte et que le préjudice allégué n'est pas établi.

Ce jugement rendu en premier ressort est susceptible d'appel.
M. M.

On 24 June, in Sudan, women and children displaced by the fighting in Al Obeid seek refuge in Tagat, gathering shelter for the internally displaced. Credit: UNICEF/PFP Geneva

By Oritro Karim
UNITED NATIONS, Jul 13 2026 (IPS)

Throughout 2026, the humanitarian crisis in Sudan has deteriorated significantly, prompting the United Nations (UN) to raise alarm over the escalation of human rights violations. Persistent clashes between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) continue to cause mass civilian casualties, drive widespread displacement, and obstruct the delivery of life-saving aid. As a result, war-torn communities are being pushed further into catastrophe, struggling with severe shortages of essential basic services and the rapid spread of infectious disease.

According to the latest UN findings, since the outbreak of hostilities in 2024, at least 59,000 civilians have been killed due to ongoing insecurity, while an additional 14 million people have been forcibly displaced. Characterized by the UN as the “worst humanitarian crisis in the world”, approximately 33.7 million people are in urgent need of aid. Millions are currently residing in highly restricted areas that remain out of reach for humanitarian organizations.

The past six months alone have been particularly turbulent for war-torn communities, with daily drone strikes being reported across Sudan, with the Kordofan and Darfur localities reporting the highest numbers of child casualties. Figures from the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) show that since May, there have been more than 35 child casualties recorded across North Kordofan, including at least 18 children killed and over 17 others injured. Some of these children are as young as two months old.

Repeated bombardment and artillery shelling have caused widespread destruction to civilian infrastructure, damaging or rendering non-functional homes, health facilities, schools, water systems, markets, and critical supply routes, which has severely restricted access to essential services. The UN estimates that roughly 500,000 civilians are at risk in and around the Al Obeid and wider North Kordofan regions, where even minor surges in violence could expose more children to grave protection risks, including death, injury, and displacement.

“Children are being caught in a relentless cycle of violence, displacement and deprivation,” said Sheldon Yett, UNICEF Representative for Sudan. “For many children, there is no safe place left. They are being killed and injured in their homes, on the roads, in markets, and while attempting to access essential services such as education and healthcare. Children must never be a target. Their lives, rights and futures must be protected.”

The disruption of water infrastructure and the collapse of the national health system have ravaged war-torn displaced communities, particularly in North Kordofan, which has been described as the epicenter of the conflict. This has resulted in a deadly new outbreak of cholera, which has already claimed more than 100 lives.

On July 10, Dr. Shible Sahbani, the World Health Organization’s (WHO) Representative to Sudan, told reporters in Geneva that there have been over 1,330 confirmed cholera cases, including 114 deaths. The true number of fatalities related to this outbreak is estimated to be much higher, with humanitarian organizations expressing fears that the outbreak could spread among hundreds of thousands of civilians who have fled North Kordofan and reside in overcrowded, unsanitary conditions. WHO also noted that civilians struggle with persistent outbreaks of dengue, malaria, meningitis, hepatitis E, and measles.

“We are particularly concerned about the spread [of cholera] to El-Obeid in North Kordofan, where the access is very limited and where the fragile health system is under increasing strain,” said Sahbani. “Health facilities are overwhelmed there and access to care is very, very limited.”

“We call for our partners and donors to help us to be able first to access and second to be able to send enough supplies and enough facilities in El-Obeid. But we know that the situation there is very, very bad and it’s worsening with higher risk of disease outbreaks, malnutrition, violence, including violence against women and children.”

On July 3, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) reported that El Obeid has faced “siege-like” conditions for the past 18 months, with the area currently being under SAF control. UN Human Rights Chief, Volker Türk, told reporters that OHCHR has documented 15 drone strikes in El Obeid and surrounding areas between June 6 and 28, leaving at least 45 civilians killed and 41 others injured. The true number of casualties is projected to be much higher.

“These attacks, and fuel shortages, have a compound impact, making it difficult for civilians to access clean water, food, transport and healthcare, and to communicate with each other and the outside world,” said Türk. “Some people are selling their belongings to finance their escape from the city. For many, the exorbitant cost of transport, and constant attacks on vehicles along exit routes, make leaving impossible.”

Furthermore, OHCHR has documented a sharp rise in human rights violations over the course of the year. According to Türk, OHCHR has recorded numerous instances of summary executions, abductions, torture, and sexual violence, particularly along routes regularly used by displaced civilians travelling across Kordofan. In El Obeid, there is a substantial risk of arbitrary arrest and detention, with the agency recording numerous cases where civilians fleeing RSF-controlled areas have been accused of collaborating with the SAF.

On June 18, Türk highlighted this surge in abuses, issuing a stark warning that an imminent offensive “risked fresh commission” of serious international crimes. He specifically noted an alarming rise in ethnically motivated attacks and the use of starvation as a weapon of war. On June 20, the UN Security Council adopted a statement in which members called for an immediate cessation of the RSF’s assault on El Obeid, as well as for all human rights violations to be thoroughly investigated and for perpetrators to be held accountable.

IPS UN Bureau Report

 

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In partnership with the Permanent Mission of the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Division of Policy, Evaluation and Training (DPET) of the UN Department of Peace Operations (DPO), IPI cohosted a hybrid public policy forum on “What MINUSMA Teaches Us about the Future of UN Peacekeeping” on July 13th.

DPO recently launched the lessons learned report “MINUSMA: A Peace That Was Not Enough,” which examines the decade-long deployment of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), which concluded its withdrawal in late 2023. The report identifies implications that extend beyond Mali and are directly relevant to the future of UN peacekeeping. It also points to the limits of UN peacekeeping in the absence of a stable peace and underscores the importance of carefully managing UN transitions.

The event facilitated a focused, policy-oriented discussion on how lessons from MINUSMA can inform more effective, adaptable, and context-sensitive UN peacekeeping. Speakers shared reflections from the Malian, regional, and UN perspectives regarding the operational and political challenges facing international engagement.

Key takeaways from the event include the need to:

• Expand the UN toolbox to contextualize missions to individual situations;
• Center national ownership, including in driving the political process;
• Manage expectations in contexts of asymmetric warfare and;
• Carefully delineate roles and responsibilities when parallel forces are present.

Opening Remarks:
Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein, President and Chief Executive Officer, International Peace Institute

Speakers:
David Haeri, Director, UN DPET, DPO
H.E. Issa Konfourou, Permanent Representative of the Republic of Mali to the UN
Mahamat Saleh Annadif, Former SRSG and Head of MINUSMA, Member of the African Union High-Level Panel of Eminent Experts (virtual)
Emma Birikorang, Director of Research, Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC) (virtual)

Closing Remarks:
Ed Caelen, Military Advisor, Permanent Mission of the Kingdom of the Netherlands to the UN

Moderator:
Jenna Russo, Director of Research and Head of the Brian Urquhart Center for Peace Operations and Peacebuilding, International Peace Institute

The post What MINUSMA Teaches Us about the Future of UN Peacekeeping appeared first on International Peace Institute.

L'athlète béninoise Noélie Yarigo a remporté le titre de championne de France du 800 mètres, dimanche 12 juillet 2026, à l'occasion de l'Open de France d'athlétisme disputé au stade de Blois, en France.

Sous les couleurs de l'AJ Blois-Onzain, l'internationale béninoise s'est une nouvelle fois illustrée dans sa discipline de prédilection. La Guéparde de Pendjari a réalisé une performance qui lui permet de décrocher le titre national français sur le 800 mètres.

Après cette consécration, Noélie Yarigo a partagé son émotion sur sa page Facebook, évoquant une saison particulièrement éprouvante. « Cette saison a été la plus dure de ma vie. Il y a eu des blessures, des doutes, des jours où j'avais juste envie d'arrêter. (…). Cette médaille, elle est pour tous ceux qui se battent dans l'ombre », a-t-elle écrit.

Cette nouvelle distinction vient récompenser la persévérance de l'athlète béninoise, qui continue de porter haut les couleurs du Bénin sur les pistes internationales.

Quatre (4) personnes ont été interpellées par la Police républicaine dans le cadre de deux opérations menées vendredi 10 juillet 2026 dans le quartier Agla à Cotonou. Ces interventions ont permis le démantèlement de deux points présumés de vente de produits psychotropes.

La première opération s'est déroulée à Agla Petit Château à la suite de renseignements faisant état d'activités illicites. Deux individus ont été interpellés. La perquisition effectuée par les forces de l'ordre a permis de saisir 9 boulettes et 2 plaquettes de chanvre indien, 3 téléphones portables, du matériel de conditionnement, un fumoir artisanal ainsi qu'une somme de 3 000 FCFA.

Une seconde intervention a été menée dans une concession située à Agla Agongbomè. Elle a conduit à l'interpellation de deux autres personnes. Les fouilles ont permis de découvrir 32 boulettes de chanvre indien, des emballages destinés au conditionnement des stupéfiants, un sachet vide de tramadol, une caisse métallique, deux téléphones portables, un broyeur, une somme de 67 000 FCFA ainsi que plusieurs autres objets.

Les quatre personnes interpellées ont été placées en garde à vue et seront soumises aux procédures judiciaires en vigueur. Les investigations se poursuivent afin d'identifier d'éventuels complices et de démanteler les réseaux d'approvisionnement liés à ces activités.

Le Tribunal de commerce de Cotonou a tranché un litige opposant deux étudiants béninois, la société ORABANK Bénin SA et la société ENERGY SARL au sujet de virements bancaires qui leur sont destinés. Dans sa décision, la juridiction a ordonné à la banque de procéder au virement des fonds restants constitués en provision au profit des deux bénéficiaires, tout en rejetant les demandes de dommages-intérêts formulées par les différentes parties.

Les deux étudiants, AZANDJEME Missi-Mahou Christ-Roi Junior et AGO Emmanuel Yedidya Ibukun vivant respectivement en France et en Suisse ont saisi le Tribunal de commerce de Cotonou pour obtenir la condamnation solidaire d'ORABANK Bénin SA et d'ENERGY SARL au paiement de 30 millions de FCFA de dommages-intérêts.

Les deux étudiants devraient recevoir des virements mensuels sur leur compte à l'étranger pendant au moins 12 mois conformément aux engagements pris par la société ENERGY SARL. Pour l'opération et aux dires de la société ENERGY SARL, informent les plaignants, ORABANK BENIN SA aurait effectivement bloqué entre ses propres mains l'équivalent de douze mois de virements dans ses livres. Les deux étudiants n'ont reçu qu'un seul virement.

Ils reprochent à la banque de n'avoir exécuté qu'un seul virement mensuel sur les douze prévus, alors que les fonds destinés à couvrir leur séjour d'études à l'étranger ont été déjà cantonnés par la banque.

Au cours de la procédure, ENERGY SARL a soutenu avoir rempli toutes ses obligations en constituant les provisions nécessaires et en obtenant des attestations bancaires d'engagement de virement. La société estimait que la responsabilité de l'interruption des transferts incombait à ORABANK Bénin SA.

La banque a fait valoir que les attestations bancaires délivrées ne constituaient pas des ordres permanents et irrévocables de virement. Selon elle, chaque transfert devait être précédé d'un ordre de virement émis par le donneur d'ordre, en l'occurrence ENERGY SARL. Elle a indiqué n'avoir reçu que deux instructions, lesquelles ont donné lieu aux seuls virements effectivement réalisés.

Après examen des pièces du dossier, le Tribunal a considéré que ni les attestations bancaires ni les ordres de virement produits ne pouvaient être assimilés à un ordre de virement permanent irrévocable. Il a estimé qu'ORABANK Bénin SA ne pouvait donc pas effectuer de nouveaux virements sans recevoir de nouvelles instructions de la société ENERGY SARL.

La juridiction a rejeté les demandes de dommages-intérêts des deux étudiants ainsi que celles formulées par ORABANK Bénin SA et ENERGY SARL, faute de preuve du préjudice invoquée.

Le Tribunal a relevé que les fonds destinés aux douze mensualités avaient été provisionnés et que le solde n'avait pas été restitué au donneur d'ordre. Il a ordonné à ORABANK Bénin SA de procéder au virement des fonds restants disponibles au profit des deux étudiants. Le Tribunal a condamné la société ENERGY SARL aux dépens.