Africa

Two of African football's biggest names, Achraf Hakimi and Mohamed Salah, are hoping to lead their nations to glory as the Africa Cup of Nations gets ready to kick off in Morocco.

Two of African football's biggest names, Achraf Hakimi and Mohamed Salah, are hoping to lead their nations to glory as the Africa Cup of Nations gets ready to kick off in Morocco.

Two of African football's biggest names, Achraf Hakimi and Mohamed Salah, are hoping to lead their nations to glory as the Africa Cup of Nations gets ready to kick off in Morocco.

Les services de la Gendarmerie nationale de Staoueli ont réussi à démanteler un réseau de prostitution qui opérait à partir d’une maison située dans la région, […]

L’article Une sexagénaire interpellée pour tenue d’un lieu de débauche avec trois clients est apparu en premier sur .

The Council of the EU and the European Parliament have provisionally agreed on an EU law establishing a list of safe countries of origin.

Council adopts measures to incentivise and simplify defence investments in the EU.

Joyce Msuya (right at table), United Nations Assistant Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Deputy Emergency Relief Coordinator, briefs the Security Council meeting on the maintenance of peace and security of Ukraine. Credit: UN Photo/Manuel Elías

By Oritro Karim
UNITED NATIONS, Dec 18 2025 (IPS)

In recent weeks, the Russo-Ukrainian War has taken a considerable turn for the worse, with armed hostilities escalating in both frequency and intensity, causing extensive damage to civilian infrastructure and a significant loss of life across Ukraine. Attacks on energy infrastructures and the resulting power outages are forcing the most vulnerable civilians to deal with a “cold, frightening ordeal” in the winter season, warned the United Nations (UN) human rights chief.

“Nearly four years into Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the plight of civilians has become even more unbearable,” said UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Volker Türk. “As peace negotiations continue, our monitoring and reporting show that the war is intensifying, causing more death, damage, and destruction…No part of the country is safe.”

According to figures from the United Nations (UN) Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), between January and November 2025, approximately 2,311 Ukrainians were killed as a direct result of war—a 26 percent increase compared to the same period in 2024 and a 70 percent increase from 2023. Turk noted that between December 2024 and November 2025, there was a significant increase in the average daily number of long-range drones used by the Russian Federation, particularly in densely-populated frontline and urban areas.

November was especially volatile, with at least 226 civilians killed and 952 injured—51 percent of which being caused by long-range missile strikes and loitering munitions from Russian armed forces. The vast majority of civilian casualties occurred in areas that were controlled by Ukraine, while roughly 60 percent were near the frontlines of the conflict. On November 18, a large-scale combined missile and drone attack killed at least 38 people in Ternopil, marking the deadliest strike in western Ukraine since the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022.

Short-range drones, aerial bombardments, and other munitions used in frontline regions have caused extensive damage to residential districts, rendering entire neighborhoods uninhabitable and triggering significant new displacement. Hospitals and clinics in frontline regions have sustained significant damage, forcing some facilities to shut down entirely and severely straining the operations of those that remain. Persisting insecurity prevents ambulances from reaching injured persons, while aid workers risk their lives to assist.

Additionally, attacks on water and energy infrastructure continue across Ukraine, disrupting access to water, heating, and electricity for millions—often for extended periods of time. The Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) noted that new attacks in Ukraine over the weekend alone have left more than 1 million people without access to water, heating, and electricity, particularly across the country’s southern region.

The Odessa, Kherson, and Chernihiv regions have reported district-wide disruptions to electricity, water, and heating services, severely straining lifesaving operations. Meanwhile, the majority of food shops and pharmacies in frontline areas—particularly in the Donetsk, Kharkiv, and Sumy regions—have shut down. Some communities in these areas have also reported having no access to electricity for more than two years.

Residents in areas of Donetsk have also reported receiving poor-quality running water only once every few days, raising alarm among humanitarian groups given the close proximity of numerous abandoned mines and chemical plants, as well as the rapidly approaching winter season which is projected to exacerbate already dire living conditions.

According to World Vision (WV), Ukrainian children and families are expected to face the harshest winter since the wake of hostilities in 2022. Temperatures this season are projected to drop below –10°C, and repeated strikes on critical energy infrastructure have left children facing an average of 16-17 hours of power cuts each day. These prolonged outages deprive families of heat, electricity, water, and essential services at the coldest time of the year—exactly when they are needed most.

“In some areas, families go up to 36 hours without heating, electricity or water. This prolonged lack of basic services puts children’s health at serious risk, disrupts their education, and threatens their overall well-being,” said Arman Grigoryan, World Vision’s Ukraine Crisis Response Director. “Humanitarian support, including winter supplies, safe spaces, and psychosocial assistance, is urgently needed to protect them.”

World Vision noted that the harshest living conditions have been recorded in northern and eastern Ukraine, such as Chernihiv, Dnipro, Donetsk, Kharkiv, and Sumy. Additionally, education for children has been severely impacted, with roughly 40 percent of children studying through remote or blended learning due to power cuts making it increasingly difficult for schools and kindergartens to operate safely.

Living conditions are also especially dire for older persons and people with disabilities, many of whom are unable to leave their homes and lack access to appropriate transit services and suitable housing. Roughly 60 percent of civilian deaths in frontline areas have been individuals over the age of 60.

The UN and its partners have been working on the frontlines to assist in winterization efforts by providing emergency shelter and protection services. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has also been distributing cash assistance to vulnerable communities for winter-specific needs such as fuel and insulation.

UNHCR estimates that approximately 12.7 million people in Ukraine are in urgent need of humanitarian assistance and protection in 2025. However, due to repeated funding cuts, the 2025 Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan for Ukraine has been forced to prioritize support for only 4.8 million people— a notable decrease from the originally targeted 8 million. As conditions continue to deteriorate, the UN is urging for increased donor contributions and broader international support to meet growing humanitarian needs.

IPS UN Bureau Report

 

Follow @IPSNewsUNBureau
!function(d,s,id){var js,fjs=d.getElementsByTagName(s)[0],p=/^http:/.test(d.location)?'http':'https';if(!d.getElementById(id)){js=d.createElement(s);js.id=id;js.src=p+'://platform.twitter.com/widgets.js';fjs.parentNode.insertBefore(js,fjs);}}(document, 'script', 'twitter-wjs');  

Lying on the other side of the globe, at first glance the Indo-Pacific seems as remote to European interests as it gets. A more careful consideration beyond the geographical distance reflected on the map, however, paints a rather different picture. The growing interconnectedness of the European and the Indo-Pacific theaters in the security realm, as well as trade dependencies in strategic commodities, such as critical minerals and semiconductors, necessitate the formulation of a more intentional EU Indo-Pacific policy recognizing the region’s centrality in Europe’s defense and economic security. At the same time, acknowledging the structural limitations of the prospective engagement is equally important. The delicate state of affairs in Taiwan and the brinkmanship in the South China Sea should also be factored in. The United States has long called for its European partners to shore up their presence in the Indo-Pacific not least to support Washington in its regional bras-de-fer with China. Besides Washington’s own agenda, a flare-up in the Indo-Pacific will have far-reaching consequences for the EU partners, both financially and strategically. After mapping the European interests linked to the region, this paper will explore the ways in which the EU may tangibly shift some of its attention to the Indo-Pacific demonstrating why this is critical and what constraints it is bound to face in the process.

Read here in pdf the Policy paper by Vasilis Petropoulos, ELIAMEP Fellow.

Introduction

The Indo-Pacific is the geographical space extending roughly from the eastern coast of Africa to the Western coast of the Americas. It encompasses South Asia, Southeast Asia, East Asia, and Oceania. This region hosts more than half of the world’s population, accounts for 60% of global GDP[1], and is home to the busiest maritime trade routes, such as the Strait of Malacca, the Taiwan Strait and the East and South China seas, featuring contested security flashpoints.

For Europe, the Indo-Pacific is a space where economic interests, strategic dependencies, and global stability converge.

The region is also the site of an intensifying rivalry between the United States and China, whose outcome will largely shape the future of the international order. For Europe, the Indo-Pacific is a space where economic interests, strategic dependencies, and global stability converge. Approximately 40 percent of the EU’s foreign trade passes through the South China Sea[2], and European industries depend heavily on supply chains rooted in East and Southeast Asia. Export controls on rare earths, disruptions in semiconductor production in Taiwan or delays in shipping through the Strait of Malacca would reverberate across Europe’s economy. Beyond economics, a military escalation in the region could fracture the transatlantic alliance and divert U.S. strategic focus away from Europe, leaving the EU more vulnerable on its eastern and southern flanks. But even absent an armed confrontation in Taiwan, the Indo-Pacific is directly tied to Europe’s security through the unprecedented dynamics to which the ongoing war in Ukraine has strikingly given shape. With North Korean troops fighting alongside the Russian invaders and with China implicitly bankrolling the beleaguered Russian economy -thus enabling the perpetuation of the Kremlin’s war effort- the Indo-Pacific theater appears to gradually become embedded into the security architecture of the Old Continent. Hybrid threats originating in the Indo-Pacific, such as organized crime and irregular migration, complete the heap of security-related matters that tie Europe to the region.

Recognizing these interconnections, the EU ought to turn anemic engagement into tangible presence. In doing so, Europe must navigate internal divisions and resource constraints, while treading carefully the geopolitical minefield of the U.S.-China rivalry. The question is not whether Europe should engage in the Indo-Pacific, but how, and to what extent, it can pursue its engagement effectively.

Skin in the game

Economic Security

As already hinted, Europe’s economic prosperity is tightly bound to the Indo-Pacific. The region hosts four of the EU’s top ten trading partners, including China, Japan, South Korea, and India[3]. Further, key European exports (e.g. machinery, automobiles, and pharmaceuticals) flow eastward, while the EU imports a vast array of goods from Indo-Pacific countries. Two sectors epitomize this interdependence most prominently: semiconductors and critical minerals.

Semiconductors

The EU’s economic model is anchored in high-value manufacturing, advanced automotive production, and digital innovation. Maintaining the momentum in these fields hinges on securing an uninterrupted supply of semiconductors. Modern vehicles -particularly electric and hybrid models- integrate hundreds of chips[4] that control everything from engine management and battery systems to safety sensors and infotainment. Increasingly, the move toward autonomous and connected vehicles depends on higher-performance chips fabricated at advanced nodes. Further, advanced chips are the central components of data centers, 5G and forthcoming 6G networks, and industrial automation systems[5]. The defence industry, too, depends on reliable access to semiconductors for advanced military aircrafts, radar systems, satellite communications, and command-and-control platforms[6].

Foundries in Indo-Pacific countries account for the bulk of chip manufacturing worldwide.

Foundries in Indo-Pacific countries account for the bulk of chip manufacturing worldwide. Indicatively, the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) produces more than 60% of the world’s semiconductors with a 71% market share and over 90% of the most advanced chips[7]. It is clear that a disruption to Taiwan’s semiconductor output would cascade directly into Europe’s supply chains resulting in production halts, escalating costs, and loss of competitiveness. It could also impede Europe’s digital transformation, compromise the rollout of critical communications networks, and affect sectors vital to national security. Semiconductors are dual-use technologies underpinning both civilian and military innovation. Therefore, any limitation in access to advanced chips would erode Europe’s technological sovereignty and strategic autonomy, leaving it reliant on the policy choices and geopolitical stability of other, non-Western actors. The graph below offers a visualization of Indo-Pacific’s dominance in global chip manufacturing.

Source: Ali Kamaly

 

Critical Minerals

Many of these minerals are mined or processed in Indo-Pacific countries, and the geographic concentration of production and refining adds a layer of systemic risk for Europe. […] While raw mineral deposits exist in many places, China has deliberately captured the downstream part of the value chain, which includes the refining, processing, separation and manufacturing of the final component.

The transition to a low-carbon, technologically advanced economy has placed critical minerals at the centre of EU’s industrial policy. Elements such as rare earths, nickel, cobalt, lithium, graphite and others form the backbone of batteries, electric vehicles (EVs), wind turbines, and advanced electronics. Many of these minerals are mined or processed in Indo-Pacific countries, and the geographic concentration of production and refining adds a layer of systemic risk for Europe. First, the role of China is pivotal. While raw mineral deposits exist in many places, China has deliberately captured the downstream part of the value chain, which includes the refining, processing, separation and manufacturing of the final component. For example, China accounts for about 65% of the world’s lithium refining capacity, over 70% for cobalt, and an astonishing 90% for rare earth minerals[8]. Second, Southeast Asia and other parts of the Indo-Pacific supply important raw and intermediate materials. For instance, Indonesia is the world’s largest producer of nickel, accounting for more than 50% of global nickel output in 2024 with Australia and New Caledonia also featuring in the list with the top ten global nickel producers[9]. The ASEAN Scoping Study on Critical Minerals Supply Chains found that Indonesia and the Philippines together account for approximately 72% of global nickel output and 14% of global cobalt output[10]. Crucially, these trends will continue to shape the critical minerals industry in the foreseeable future with Indo-Pacific (especially China) remaining at the epicenter. The tables below show projections about the dominant players in the six main critical minerals in 2030.

 

Table 1: Mining

Top 3 producers: #1, % #2, % #3, % Copper Chile, 23% DRC, 14% Peru, 10% Lithium Australia, 33% China, 23% Chile, 12% Cobalt DRC, 66% Indonesia, 10% Russia, 3% Rare earths China, 54% Australia,18% Myanmar, 9% Nickel Indonesia, 62% Philippines, 8% New Caledonia, 6% Graphite China, 82% Madagascar, 3% Mozambique, 2%

Source: IEA

 

Table 2: Processing/Refining

Top 3 processors: #1, % #2, % #3, % Copper China, 46% DRC, 7% Chile, 5% Lithium China, 57% Chile, 15% Argentina, 13% Cobalt China, 74% Finland, 6% Japan, 4% Rare earths China, 77% Malaysia, 12% Australia, 3% Nickel Indonesia, 44% China, 21% Japan, 6% Graphite China, 93% Japan, 3% U.S. 1%

Source: IEA

Because the supply chains for these minerals are globally interlinked, a disruption at any point (mining, refining, transport, processing) can severely undercut the EU’s environmental policies enshrined in the “Green Deal”.

Needless to say, the implications for Europe’s green transition are multifold. Europe is seeking to electrify transport, scale-up renewable energy and build digitally interconnected and resilient infrastructure (e.g., smart grids). Electrification means batteries. These in turn require nickel-rich chemistries (for higher energy density), cobalt (for stability in many chemistries), and graphite or other anode materials. Because the supply chains for these minerals are globally interlinked, a disruption at any point (mining, refining, transport, processing) can severely undercut the EU’s environmental policies enshrined in the “Green Deal”. Consider, for example, the battery value chain. The extraction may be in one country, but the ore is shipped to a refining complex in another country (often China) for conversion into battery-grade materials. The high degree of downstream concentration in one geography makes the supply chain vulnerable. Further, the OECD publication “The Role of Critical Minerals in Clean Energy Transitions” shows that China and Myanmar play dominant roles in processing, separation and downstream production of magnets, alloys and components[11]. From Europe’s perspective, this means that raw-material supply risks are not confined to mining. The biggest risk lies in the “mid‐stream” and “down‐stream” segments, that is, refining, separation, processing and fabrication of value‐added materials.

Because China maintains a tight grip on these segments, Europe and other jurisdictions are exposed to strategic bottlenecks. A mining source thousands of kilometers away becomes vulnerable if the processing plant is in China or if shipments must pass through geopolitical flashpoints in the Indo-Pacific. China’s preeminence in the strategic supply chains of critical minerals affords Beijing the opportunity to weaponize trade to pursue political ends. The placement of export controls on rare earths –a textbook measure taken by China in its bid to afflict the Western economies- has caused manufacturing disruptions, driving up prices and undermining the competitiveness of domestic products.

Similar to semiconductors, critical minerals are also irreplaceable for the European Defense Technological Industrial Base (EDTIB). Critical raw materials, such as graphite, cobalt, beryllium, and germanium are needed for the production of an array of weaponry, including fighter aircrafts, tanks, missiles, torpedoes, artillery, and ammunition, military hardware in which the EU strives to attain self-sufficiency. According to a risk assessment conducted by the Hague Centre for Strategic Studies[12], the supply of many of the aforementioned materials is very likely to incur disruptions due to instability or geopolitical bickering.

Military Security

The globalization of markets is what has made the Indo-Pacific indispensable to Europe’s economic security. The intensified great power competition reminiscent of Cold War era-style establishment of opposing blocks is what renders the Indo-Pacific vital to Europe’s hard security as well.

A military escalation in the Indo-Pacific, especially around Taiwan, would have immediate consequences for Europe by drawing U.S. attention and resources away from the Euro-Atlantic theater.

A military escalation in the Indo-Pacific, especially around Taiwan, would have immediate consequences for Europe by drawing U.S. attention and resources away from the Euro-Atlantic theater. If Washington were forced to reallocate strategic bandwidth to Asia, the EU would face greater pressure to shoulder the security burden on its eastern and southern flanks, where threats from Russia, instability in the Middle East, and irregular migration already test Europe’s resilience. Even without open conflict, developments in the Indo-Pacific increasingly shape Europe’s security landscape, as seen in the Ukraine war. North Korea’s provision of frontline troops and weapons to Russia, along with China’s economic lifeline that sustains Moscow’s war machine, demonstrates that actors in the Indo-Pacific can directly amplify threats to European stability.

Hybrid Threats 

Equally destabilizing for Europe are hybrid threats emanating from the Indo-Pacific region. The overseas territories of an EU powerhouse are turning into a springboard for irregular migration and organized crime. Criminal groups have established themselves[13] in the French Polynesia, New Caledonia, and the French West Indies engaging in drug trafficking, illegal fishing, gold smuggling, and arms flows as they exploit the vast exclusive economic zones where maritime surveillance is inadequate. These groups wield substantial control of international migration routes using the French territories as transit nodes for migration flows that ultimately reach Europe. Civil strife, climate change, political instability, and economic disparities in the Indo-Pacific exacerbate this trend. Once migrants enter a French territory, they are closer to gaining access to the European Union’s legal space, creating concerns that organized networks could exploit these territories as stepping-stones or “side doors” into Europe. Combined, these pressures increase border insecurity directly impacting Europe’s internal security.

This growing entanglement shows that Europe cannot compartmentalize the two regions. The Indo-Pacific is now woven into the continent’s security architecture, giving the EU undeniable “skin in the game” in preserving stability and building partnerships across the region.

Pinpointing the main hurdles 

To do so, the EU has to step up its involvement in the Indo-Pacific. In formulating its strategy for a more active engagement, Brussels should take into account the limitations it is destined to face.

…the EU’s Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) is not designed for distant power projection.

First, the EU’s Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) is not designed for distant power projection. Unlike the U.S., the EU lacks forward bases, logistical capacity, and naval assets suited for sustained Indo-Pacific operations. Any European military contribution would therefore be limited to symbolic deployments, joint exercises, or capacity-building missions.

Consensus-based decision-making and domestic political fragmentation across Europe also constrain the EU’s ability to act swiftly or decisively as a whole. Some member states, especially in Central and Eastern Europe, prioritize transatlantic solidarity and view China with suspicion; others, like Germany and Hungary, emphasize economic pragmatism appearing more conciliatory vis-à-vis Beijing due to their tight ties in trade and investments. Furthermore, defense spending disparities among member states hinder the formation of a unified strategic posture. So does the divergence in threat perception: Austria or Ireland might not view the threats stemming from the Indo-Pacific as immediate as they seem to France with its overseas territories or to the Baltic countries with an aggressive Russia on their borders- backed by Indo-Pacific actors.

Compounding to the constraining factors is China’s central role in European trade, which creates strong disincentives for confrontational policies.

Compounding to the constraining factors is China’s central role in European trade, which creates strong disincentives for confrontational policies. While the EU recognizes the risks of overreliance, especially after the pandemic and the Ukraine war, full-scale decoupling is neither feasible nor desirable. Consequently, the EU must pursue a policy of de-risking without disengaging, a pursuit requiring deft balancing that might sound straightforward in theory but can prove a herculean undertaking in practice even for the most experienced European bureaucrats.

Finally, Russia’s ongoing war in Ukraine consumes Europe’s attention and resources. Other challenges facing Europe, though, have not magically disappeared. The EU’s southern neighborhood grapples with persistent instability. Climate change, energy security, and migration pressures further stretch European capacities. In this context, sustained Indo-Pacific engagement risks being deprioritized unless directly linked to core European interests. Well-constructed and clearly communicated policy messaging on why the Indo-Pacific matters to Europe can serve in achieving the latter.

Rising to the challenge 

Despite these obstacles, Europe, both collectively and at national level, has taken some initial steps toward strengthening its presence in the Indo-Pacific.

The 2021 EU Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific[14] marked a watershed. It framed the region as “vital for the EU’s interests” and called for cooperation in seven areas: sustainable and inclusive prosperity, green transition, ocean governance, digital partnerships, connectivity, security, and human security. The strategy’s ambition is evident in its breadth, yet its implementation remains uneven. Unlike the U.S., the EU lacks a hard-power footprint in the Indo-Pacific. The strategy is therefore designed around partnerships leveraging diplomacy, trade, and development tools rather than military presence. The EU Strategic Compass for Security and Defense (2022) sought to fix that. Recognizing the growing assertiveness of China in the Indo-Pacific and the strategic importance of the region to Europe, the strategic compass expanded the Coordinated Maritime Presences (CMPs) to the Indian Ocean while calling for more joint exercises and port calls in the Indo-Pacific with the aim to strengthen the EU regional presence.[15]

Beyond the collective front some EU member states have forged their own Indo-Pacific policies, contributing to a patchwork of European engagement. France maintains territories in the Indian and Pacific Oceans (La Réunion, New Caledonia, French Polynesia) and a permanent military presence. It views itself as an Indo-Pacific power and a natural anchor for EU engagement. Germany adopted “Policy Guidelines for the Indo-Pacific”[16] in 2020, emphasizing diversification of partnerships and a rules-based order. The Netherlands followed suit in 2020[17], focusing on trade and security cooperation. Italy and Spain are expanding defense dialogues with India, Japan, and ASEAN.

Given the vitality of the Indo-Pacific to the European economies and to the EU’s strategic autonomy writ large, the moment has come for Brussels to transform its hitherto timid engagement with the region into a vigorous and all-encompassing Indo-Pacific strategy.

Yet, coordination at the EU level remains limited. The EU Naval Mission Atalanta (operating in the western Indian Ocean) and joint exercises or port calls with partners like Japan and India represent embryonic steps toward a coherent European presence. On the other hand, initiatives, such as Global Gateway[18], promising €300 billion in sustainable investment, aim to enhance Europe’s soft power and support resilient infrastructure in the Indo-Pacific. However, questions remain about financing, coordination, and visibility compared to China’s extensive network of BRI projects. Given the vitality of the Indo-Pacific to the European economies and to the EU’s strategic autonomy writ large, the moment has come for Brussels to transform its hitherto timid engagement with the region into a vigorous and all-encompassing Indo-Pacific strategy.

The following policy recommendations aim to guide European policymaking in this direction:

• Maritime security

Maritime security represents the most practical entry point for upgraded European involvement; and probably the most instrumental one. Trade routes through the South China Sea and Indian Ocean function as Europe’s economic lifelines. The EU’s dependence on maritime security in these waters ties its prosperity to the stability of these distant sea lanes. Building on operations like Atalanta and AGENOR, the EU could expand naval patrols into the broader Indo-Pacific under a new Maritime Security Compact with ASEAN and regional partners within the framework of the EU Maritime Security Strategy (EUMSS). It could also reinforce the EU Coordinated Maritime Presences (CMPs) concept in the northwestern Indian Ocean and explore its extension to the western Pacific. Similarly, it can expand joint naval drills with Indo-Pacific partners both in geographical breadth and in scope. In particular, joint exercises may be conducted in more parts of the Indo-Pacific waters, while including training in war scenarios, red teaming, and breaking of potential naval blockades of critical sea lanes. Additionally, the EU could ramp-up investments in information-sharing mechanisms and capacity-building for regional coast guards. Such measures would not only safeguard critical trade routes but also demonstrate Europe’s commitment to free navigation and to a rules-based maritime order.

• Supply chain diversification

To reduce strategic dependencies, the EU should diversify semiconductor supply chains by strengthening partnerships with Taiwan, South Korea, and Japan, while supporting EU domestic chip production through the European Chips Act.

To reduce strategic dependencies, the EU should diversify semiconductor supply chains by strengthening partnerships with Taiwan, South Korea, and Japan, while supporting EU domestic chip production through the European Chips Act. Developing critical minerals partnerships with Indonesia, Australia, and India under transparent environmental and labor standards could also go a long way in feeding into Europe’s image as a global leader in sustainable development, while buttressing the diversification of the continent’s supply chains. A credible economic footprint would reinforce Europe’s relevance and complement its security engagement.

• Multilateralism and Diplomacy

Europe’s comparative advantage still lies in norm-setting and diplomacy. The EU should try to act as a mediating voice in U.S.-China tensions, emphasizing international law and open trade, while fostering regional crisis prevention initiatives, including confidence-building measures in the South China Sea. Regarding ASEAN, the EU may institutionalize the EU-ASEAN strategic dialogue with a permanent secretariat-level mechanism and build on the EU-ASEAN strategic partnership to revive sincere talks on a region-to-region free trade agreement, which will enhance integration and mutual economic resilience. Further, the EU would do well to upgrade the current format of talks from a ministerial to heads-of-state level dialogue. Such diplomatic activism would underscore Europe’s role as a stabilizing actor rather than a partisan power.

• Selected Bilateral Partnerships

The EU should deepen cooperation with established partners (Japan, India, Australia, and South Korea) and initiate partnerships with others through joint exercises, technology synergies, and joint research in critical technologies and cybersecurity. Triangular cooperation (e.g., EU-Japan-ASEAN infrastructure projects) could amplify impact while sharing burdens. A more robust presence would also send a message to China and North Korea that Europe is not a passive spectator of the latter’s intercontinental interference on Russia’s side in Ukraine. Rather, it will show that Europe can bring the competition to their own neighborhood, reinforcing its bargaining position. By strengthening the capacities of their own regional rivals while keeping channels of communication open, the EU can plausibly have a shot at persuading China and North Korea to dial down support to Moscow switching to a bold, but calculated, sticks-and-carrots approach.

• Leveraging NATO

While the EU should avoid duplicating NATO’s structures, closer coordination can align transatlantic and Indo-Pacific strategies. NATO’s 2022 Strategic Concept[19] already recognizes China as a systemic challenge. European contributions to Indo-Pacific security can thus complement, rather than compete with, Alliance objectives. For instance, enhanced interoperability between EU naval deployments and NATO partners in the region, along with coordinated sanctions and export-control regimes, can further reinforce collective deterrence.

Conclusion

The Indo-Pacific has emerged as a key node along the chain of the core European interests. Although pressing issues in its immediate neighborhood would not allow the EU to realize a “pivot to Asia” akin to that professed by the Obama administration back in 2011, the EU leadership would do well to formulate a holistic Indo-Pacific policy in its quest for strategic autonomy. Europe’s economic security largely rests upon intricate supply chains of strategic commodities, such as semiconductors and critical minerals. With upstream and downstream segments of these supply chains concentrated in Southeast Asia and even dominated by China, Europe is vulnerable to trade bottlenecks that can cause unmanageable setbacks in EU’s industrial production, green transition, and defense innovation. From a military perspective, the direct and indirect support of certain Indo-Pacific countries to Russia -namely North Korea and China- has laid bare the interconnectedness of the strategic theaters spanning the Eurasian supercontinent, while the Sino-American rivalry, if not tempered, risks to divert Washington’s resources away from Europe leaving the latter exposed to multiple threats. Expanding on the already existing cooperation mechanisms with Indo-Pacific countries and harnessing its central role in global diplomacy and multilateralism, the EU must prop-up its engagement in the region in its bid to safeguard the aforementioned interests. Coordination with NATO is also essential as the two distinct alliances work closely to achieve common goals in the Indo-Pacific complementing each other rather than going circles in an unproductive overlapping. Structural and systemic limitations may hinder deeper involvement, but the EU has the ability to navigate constraints to the degree that its Indo-Pacific engagement does not raise the risks of accentuating intra-EU divisions or exacerbating geopolitical tensions that might bring the region to the precipice of an armed confrontation.

[1] U.S. Department of State,” Indo-Pacific Strategy (2021–2025)”, 2021–2025, accessed November 2, 2025, https://2021-2025.state.gov/indo-pacific-strategy/.

[2] European External Action Service, “The EU Approach to the Indo-Pacific”, June 3, 2021, European External Action Service, accessed November 2, 2025, https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/eu-approach-indo-pacific_en.

[3] European Parliament, “EU – Indo-Pacific Trade Relations (Hearing, INTA, 1 September 2022),” European Parliament Think Tank, September 1, 2022, accessed November 2, 2025, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/events/details/eu-indo-pacific-trade-relations-/20220715CHE10501.

[4] Glenn Burm, “Semiconductor and beyond: Global Semiconductor Industry Outlook 2026”, PwC, 2025, 11–14, accessed November 10, 2025, https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/industries/technology/pwc-semiconductor-and-beyond-2026-full-report.pdf.

[5] Ibid. 16–20

[6] Sujai Shivakumar and Charles W. Wessner, “Semiconductors and National Defense: What Are the Stakes?” CSIS Commentary, June 8, 2022, accessed November 10, 2025, https://www.csis.org/analysis/semiconductors-and-national-defense-what-are-stakes. csis.org.

[7] David Sacks and Seaton Huang, “Onshoring Semiconductor Production: National Security Versus Economic Efficiency.” Council on Foreign Relations, September 27, 2022. Accessed November 10, 2025. https://www.cfr.org/article/onshoring-semiconductor-production-national-security-versus-economic-efficiency. Council on Foreign Relations.

[8] Elvire Fabry, “A looming war for minerals?”, Jacques Delors Institute, April 2023, Accessed 23 November, 2025 https://institutdelors.eu/en/publications/la-guerre-des-minerais-aura-t-elle-lieu-2/.

[9] Melissa Pistilli, “Top 9 Nickel-producing Countries”, INN, June 04, 2025, Accessed 23 November, 2025 https://investingnews.com/daily/resource-investing/base-metals-investing/nickel-investing/top-nickel-producing-countries/

[10]IGF on Mining, Minerals, Metals, and Sustainable Development, “The ASEAN Scoping Study on Critical Minerals Supply Chains”, ASEAN-IGF Minerals Cooperation, May 2023.

[11] OECD, “The Role of Critical Minerals in Clean Energy Transitions”, May 14, 2021.

[12] Benedetta Girardi, Irina Patrahau, Giovanni Cisco, and Michel Rademaker. 2023. Strategic Raw Materials for Defence: Mapping European Industry Needs. January, 2023.

[13] Secrétariat général de la défense et de la sécurité nationale (SGDSN), “Revue Nationale Stratégique 2025”, Paris, 2025, p.20.

[14] European Commission & European External Action Service. “Joint Communication on the EU Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo‑Pacific” JOIN(2021) 24 final. Brussels, September 16, 2021.

[15] Council of the European Union, “A Strategic Compass for Security and Defense”, 21 March, 2022.

[16] Federal Foreign Office (Germany), “Policy Guidelines for the Indo-Pacific”, Germany–Europe–Asia: Shaping the 21st Century Together”, Berlin: Federal Foreign Office, 2020.

[17] Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Indo-Pacific: Guidelines for Strengthening Dutch and EU Cooperation with Partners in Asia”, Government of Netherlands, 13 November 2020.

[18] European Commission and European External Action Service, “Global Gateway: European Union Strategy for Sustainable Global Connectivity”, Brussels, 2021.

[19] North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “NATO 2022 Strategic Concept”, adopted at the Madrid Summit, 29 June 2022

 

Bibliography

Miller, Chris. Chip War: The Fight for the World’s Most Critical Technology. New York: Scribner, 2022.

U.S. Department of State. Indo-Pacific Strategy (2021–2025). Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, 2021.

European External Action Service. The EU Approach to the Indo-Pacific. Brussels: European External Action Service, 2021.

European Parliament. EU – Indo-Pacific Trade Relations (Hearing, INTA, 1 September 2022). Brussels: European Parliament Think Tank, 2022.

Burm, Glenn. Semiconductor and Beyond: Global Semiconductor Industry Outlook 2026. PwC, 2025.

Shivakumar, Sujai, and Charles W. Wessner. Semiconductors and National Defense: What Are the Stakes? CSIS Commentary. Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2022.

Sacks, David, and Seaton Huang. Onshoring Semiconductor Production: National Security Versus Economic Efficiency, Council on Foreign Relations, 2022.

Fabry, Elvire. A Looming War for Minerals? Jacques Delors Institute, April 2023.

Pistilli, Melissa. Top 9 Nickel-Producing Countries. INN (Investing News Network), June 4, 2025.

Intergovernmental Forum on Mining, Minerals, Metals and Sustainable Development (IGF). The ASEAN Scoping Study on Critical Minerals Supply Chains. ASEAN–IGF Minerals Cooperation. May 2023.

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). The Role of Critical Minerals in Clean Energy Transitions. Paris: OECD Publishing, 2021.

European Commission and European External Action Service. Joint Communication on the EU Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific. *JOIN(2021) 24 final. Brussels, September 16, 2021.

Federal Foreign Office (Germany). Germany–Europe–Asia: Shaping the 21st Century Together. Policy Guidelines for the Indo-Pacific. Berlin: Federal Foreign Office, 2020.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Netherlands). Indo-Pacific: Guidelines for Strengthening Dutch and EU Cooperation with Partners in Asia. The Hague: Government of the Netherlands, November 13, 2020.

European Commission and European External Action Service. Global Gateway: European Union Strategy for Sustainable Global Connectivity. Brussels: European Commission, 2021.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization. NATO 2022 Strategic Concept. adopted at the Madrid Summit, 29 June 2022.

Girardi, Benedetta, Patrahau Irina, Ciscon Giovanni, and Rademaker Michel. Strategic Raw Materials for Defence: Mapping European Industry Needs. January 2023.

Council of the European Union.  A Strategic Compass for Security and Defense, 21 March 2022.

Secrétariat général de la défense et de la sécurité nationale (SGDSN). Revue Nationale Stratégique 2025. Paris 2025.

DR Congo's government say the announced withdrawal is intended to distract the US mediation team.

For years, smallholder farmers across Kenya have been engaged in a legal battle with the government over a law that criminalizes the practice of saving, sharing and exchanging indigenous seeds. In 2022, a group of 15 Kenyan smallholder farmers petitioned the country’s High Court, seeking to compel the government to review sections of a law […]

The air force personnel have been released but have not yet returned home, Nigeria says.

La fédération nigériane de football se plaint auprès de la FIFA de l'éligibilité de certains joueurs de la République démocratique du Congo qui ont participé aux barrages de la Coupe du monde 2026.

SACD és társai
The rules on the admissibility of an action for infringement of the copyright in a collective work must ensure that the right to effective judicial protection is observed, by not making the procedure provided for unnecessarily complicated or costly

Hamoudi kontra Frontex
Kártérítési kereset a Frontex ellen azonnali visszaküldés esetén: a Bíróság védi a hatékony bírósági felülvizsgálathoz való jogot

WS és társai kontra Frontex
Közös visszaküldési műveletek: a Bíróság nagyrészt hatályon kívül helyezi a Törvényszék azon ítéletét, amely egy szíriai menekültcsaládnak a Frontex ellen benyújtott kártérítési keresetét elutasította azt követően, hogy Görögországból Törökországba szállították őket

Bizottság kontra Lengyelország
Jogállamiság: a lengyel alkotmánybíróság több alapvető uniós jogelvet is megsértett, amikor figyelmen kívül hagyta a Bíróság ítélkezési gyakorlatát

Un regard sur les détails clés de la stratégie de sécurité de Trump et ses implications pour le monde.

Claudia Ignacio Álvarez in San Lorenzo de Azqueltan, Jalisco, Mexico. Credit : Eber Huitzil

By Claudia Ignacio Álvarez
MICHOACÁN, Mexico , Dec 18 2025 (IPS)

My niece Roxana Valentín Cárdenas was 21 years old when she was killed. She was a Purépecha Indigenous woman from San Andrés Tziróndaro, a community on the shores of Lake Pátzcuaro in the Mexican state of Michoacán.

Roxana was killed during a peaceful march organised by another Indigenous community commemorating the recovery of their lands. Forty-six years earlier, three people had been murdered during that same land struggle. This time, the commemoration was once again met with gunfire.

Roxana was not armed and was not participating in the march. She encountered the demonstration and was struck by gunfire. Her death was deeply personal, but it took place within a broader context of long-standing violence linked to land and territory.

That violence has intensified in Michoacán recently, where the assassination of a mayor in November this year underscored how deeply insecurity has penetrated public life and how little protection exists for civilians, community leaders and local authorities alike.

Across Mexico, Indigenous people are being killed for defending land, water and forests. What governments and corporations often describe as “development” is experienced by our communities as dispossession enforced by violence – through land grabbing, water theft and the silencing of those who resist.

A way of life under threat
I come from San Andrés Tziróndaro, a farming, fishing and musical community. For generations, we have cared for the lake and the surrounding forests as collective responsibilities essential to life. That way of life is now under threat.

In Michoacán, extractive pressure takes different forms. In some Indigenous territories, it is mining. In our region, it is agro-industrial production, particularly avocados and berries grown for export. Communal land intended for subsistence is leased for commercial agriculture. Water is extracted from Lake Pátzcuaro through irregularly installed pipes to irrigate agricultural fields, depriving local farmers of access.

Agrochemicals contaminate soil and water, forests are deliberately burned to enable land-use change, and ecosystems are transformed into monocultures that consume vast amounts of water. This is not development. It is extraction.

Violence as a method of enforcement
When Indigenous communities resist these processes, violence follows.

Two cases illustrate this reality and remain unresolved.

José Gabriel Pelayo, a human rights defender and member of our organisation, has been forcibly disappeared for more than a year. Despite an urgent action issued by the United Nations Committee on Enforced Disappearances, progress has been blocked. Authorities have delayed access to the investigation file, and meaningful search efforts have yet to begin. His family continues to wait for answers.

Eustacio Alcalá Díaz, a defender from the Nahua community of San Juan Huitzontla, was murdered after opposing mining operations imposed on his territory without consultation. After his killing, the community was paralysed by fear, and it was no longer possible to continue human rights work safely.

Together, these cases show how violence and impunity are used to suppress community resistance.

Militarisation is not protection
It is against this backdrop of escalating violence and impunity that the Mexican state has once again turned to militarisation. Thousands of soldiers are being deployed to Michoacán, and authorities point to arrests and security operations as indicators of stability.

In practice, militarisation often coincides with areas of high extractive interest. Security forces are deployed in regions targeted for mining, agro-industrial expansion or large infrastructure projects, creating conditions that allow these activities to proceed while community resistance is contained.

Indigenous people experience this not as protection, but as surveillance, intimidation and criminalisation. While companies may claim neutrality, they benefit from these security arrangements and rarely challenge the violence or displacement that accompanies them, raising serious questions about corporate complicity.

A global governance failure
Indigenous territories are opened to extractive industries operating across borders, while accountability remains fragmented. Corporations divide their operations across jurisdictions, making responsibility for environmental harm and human rights abuses difficult to establish.

Voluntary corporate commitments have not prevented violence or environmental degradation. National regulations remain uneven and weakly enforced, particularly in regions affected by corruption and organised crime. This is not only a national failure. It is a failure of global governance.

International responsibility, now
In this context, I have recently spent ten days in the United Kingdom with the support of Peace Brigades International (PBI), meeting with parliamentarians, officials from the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, and civil society organisations.

These discussions are part of a broader international effort to ensure that governments whose companies, financial systems or diplomatic relationships are linked to extractive activities take responsibility for preventing harm and protecting those at risk.

While the UK is only one actor, its policies on corporate accountability and support for human rights defenders have consequences far beyond its borders.

Why binding international rules are necessary
For years, Indigenous peoples and civil society organisations have called for a binding United Nations treaty on business and human rights. The urgency of this demand is reflected in the lives lost defending land and water and in the defenders who remain disappeared.

A binding treaty could require mandatory human rights and environmental due diligence across global supply chains, guarantee access to justice beyond national borders, and recognise the protection of human rights defenders as a legal obligation. It could make Free, Prior and Informed Consent enforceable rather than optional.

Such a treaty would not prevent development. It would ensure that development does not depend on violence, dispossession and impunity.

Defending life for everyone
Indigenous peoples are not obstacles to progress. We are defending ecosystems that sustain life far beyond our territories. Indigenous women are often at the forefront of this defence, even as we face extraordinary risks.

When defenders disappear, when others are murdered, and when young women like my niece lose their lives, it is not only our communities that suffer. The world loses those protecting land, water and biodiversity during a deep ecological crisis.

Defending life and land should not come at the cost of human lives.

Claudia Ignacio Álvarez is an Indigenous Purépecha feminist, lesbian, and environmental human rights defender from San Andrés Tziróndaro, Michoacán. Through the Red Solidaria de Derechos Humanos, she supports Indigenous and rural communities defending their territories from extractive industries and organised crime. Her work has been supported by Peace Brigades International (PBI) since 2023.

IPS UN Bureau

 

Follow @IPSNewsUNBureau
!function(d,s,id){var js,fjs=d.getElementsByTagName(s)[0],p=/^http:/.test(d.location)?'http':'https';if(!d.getElementById(id)){js=d.createElement(s);js.id=id;js.src=p+'://platform.twitter.com/widgets.js';fjs.parentNode.insertBefore(js,fjs);}}(document, 'script', 'twitter-wjs');  

Manchester Museum curators hope the exhibition of African items will provoke 'honest conversation'.

British citizens Abdifatah Gulaid and Noah Ihiekwe were seen carrying guns and parading with troops.