Diplomacy & Defense Think Tank News

Many colonies in Africa attained independence through negotiated settlements. However, several others engaged in armed liberation struggles, for example, Kenya, Namibia, South Africa, Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), and the Portuguese colonies of Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea Bissau, Mozambique, and São Tomé and Príncipe. Newly independent states provided liberation movements with bases on their territories and political, military, intellectual, ideological, material, and moral support. In West Africa, Ghana’s first president, Kwame Nkrumah, a notable pan-Africanist, declared in his Independence Day speech in 1957, “Our independence is meaningless unless it is linked up with the total liberation of the African continent.” In East Africa, Julius Nyerere and Jomo Kenyatta, the first presidents of independent Tanzania and Kenya respectively, showed similar commitment to Pan-Africanism and anticolonialism by hosting refugees fleeing armed struggles in Southern Africa. Tanzania hosted the Organization of African Unity Liberation Committee supported anticolonial resistance and liberation movements. President Nyerere supported them for “challenging injustices of empire and apartheid” and declared, “I train freedom fighters”. He encouraged Tanzanians living around liberation movement camps to welcome these movements and their freedom fighters and also protect them from agents of colonial governments. Support also came from many other countries on the continent including Nigeria, Ethiopia, and Algeria. The latter provided sanctuary to representatives of liberation movements such as Nelson Mandela of the African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa.

Many colonies in Africa attained independence through negotiated settlements. However, several others engaged in armed liberation struggles, for example, Kenya, Namibia, South Africa, Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), and the Portuguese colonies of Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea Bissau, Mozambique, and São Tomé and Príncipe. Newly independent states provided liberation movements with bases on their territories and political, military, intellectual, ideological, material, and moral support. In West Africa, Ghana’s first president, Kwame Nkrumah, a notable pan-Africanist, declared in his Independence Day speech in 1957, “Our independence is meaningless unless it is linked up with the total liberation of the African continent.” In East Africa, Julius Nyerere and Jomo Kenyatta, the first presidents of independent Tanzania and Kenya respectively, showed similar commitment to Pan-Africanism and anticolonialism by hosting refugees fleeing armed struggles in Southern Africa. Tanzania hosted the Organization of African Unity Liberation Committee supported anticolonial resistance and liberation movements. President Nyerere supported them for “challenging injustices of empire and apartheid” and declared, “I train freedom fighters”. He encouraged Tanzanians living around liberation movement camps to welcome these movements and their freedom fighters and also protect them from agents of colonial governments. Support also came from many other countries on the continent including Nigeria, Ethiopia, and Algeria. The latter provided sanctuary to representatives of liberation movements such as Nelson Mandela of the African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa.

Many colonies in Africa attained independence through negotiated settlements. However, several others engaged in armed liberation struggles, for example, Kenya, Namibia, South Africa, Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), and the Portuguese colonies of Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea Bissau, Mozambique, and São Tomé and Príncipe. Newly independent states provided liberation movements with bases on their territories and political, military, intellectual, ideological, material, and moral support. In West Africa, Ghana’s first president, Kwame Nkrumah, a notable pan-Africanist, declared in his Independence Day speech in 1957, “Our independence is meaningless unless it is linked up with the total liberation of the African continent.” In East Africa, Julius Nyerere and Jomo Kenyatta, the first presidents of independent Tanzania and Kenya respectively, showed similar commitment to Pan-Africanism and anticolonialism by hosting refugees fleeing armed struggles in Southern Africa. Tanzania hosted the Organization of African Unity Liberation Committee supported anticolonial resistance and liberation movements. President Nyerere supported them for “challenging injustices of empire and apartheid” and declared, “I train freedom fighters”. He encouraged Tanzanians living around liberation movement camps to welcome these movements and their freedom fighters and also protect them from agents of colonial governments. Support also came from many other countries on the continent including Nigeria, Ethiopia, and Algeria. The latter provided sanctuary to representatives of liberation movements such as Nelson Mandela of the African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa.

Les services de la sûreté de wilaya de Tizi Ouzou ont procédé à l’arrestation du conducteur d’un véhicule utilitaire pris en flagrant délit de pollution […]

L’article Fin de l’impunité à Tizi-Ouzou : la police arrête un commerçant qui a déversé des déchets dans la nature est apparu en premier sur .

Elena Lazarou, Director General, ELIAMEP

The 2026 Munich Security Conference gave the sense of a forum negotiating the terms of what comes next. The tone was measured, but the subtext was unmistakable: the assumptions that underpinned three decades of relative geopolitical coherence are eroding. What replaces them remains unsettled. On the positive side, it could be an opportunity.

Three core dynamics defining Munich this year were particularly interesting: transatlantic recalibration, the rising agency of middle powers and the Global South, and the expanding definition of security itself to match the geotechnological nature of our times. These trends are not new: they echo debates and concerns from previous years, but the discussion has evolved and the participants have matured and diversified.

Transatlantic Recalibration?

There was no open rupture between Europe and the United States. Yet neither was there a return to complacency. European leaders continue to affirm NATO’s centrality, yet strategic autonomy is no longer abstract rhetoric. From defense industrial capacity to energy diversification and digital infrastructure, Europe is hedging against systemic volatility. For the United States, alliance unity remains central but increasingly framed through domestic political sustainability – and domestic competition of identity related narratives. At the same time, for the European audience, one thing is clear: burden-sharing and alignment must be reciprocal and measurable. The transatlantic relationship is indeed recalibrating. And while the point was made that partnership endures; dependency does not.

Middle Powers and the Global South: From Participants to Architects?

No one knows dependency as well as some of what we now refer to as the middle powers of the ‘Global South’. Perhaps the most striking shift in this year’s Munich was not in what Western leaders said, but in who spoke with confidence. Middle powers — India, Brazil, the Gulf states — are no longer navigating between blocs; they are shaping the environment in which blocs operate. Their diplomacy is pragmatic and transactional. Engagement is diversified. Alignment is selective. This is now referred to by pundits as ‘multi-vector’ foreign policy and is increasingly appealing to states north and south. It could be argued that it is a return to what we once simply called ‘realist’.

Voices from Africa, Latin America, and parts of Asia present in the Bavarian capital underscored a structural gap (and not for the first time): global governance structures lag behind contemporary realities. Security debates emphasise defence and deterrence but still sideline debt distress, development financing, and climate vulnerability. In so doing, they do not resonate in much of the world.

For many of these countries, instability is fiscal, climatic, and demographic long before it manifests as military or territorial crises. Middle powers and Global South actors are asserting agency — and demanding that the architecture of order accommodate it.

One of the ‘quieter’ but consequential conversations focused on the intersection of development, humanitarian support, and security. Delegates from the Global South stressed that fragile states are destabilized not only by military threats, but by chronic underinvestment in infrastructure, social services, and governance. Humanitarian crises — from conflict-driven displacement to climate-induced food insecurity — are immediate pressures, but short-term aid alone cannot stabilize societies. But rather than just voicing concern, they also offered solutions, or at least proposals. An important one is that predictable development financing is preventive security. Long-term investment in education, health, energy, and infrastructure reduces the likelihood of crises escalating into broader regional instability.

On humanitarian support, experts from across the globe re-emphasized that it must complement, not replace, structural solutions. Emergency aid is essential to alleviate suffering, but without sustained development mechanisms, fragile states remain vulnerable to repeated shocks. Several voices emphasized that equitable financing, and mechanisms to address systemic vulnerabilities are critical to prevent recurring humanitarian crises. This is perhaps more important than ever, as the future of the United Nations and their reform enters the microscope – North and South. An opportunity is there, but a risk too. But the related conversations inside and outside closed doors highlighted a simple but often overlooked principle: stability is built before crises erupt, and humanitarian support is only one pillar in that architecture. Development and crisis response are inseparable in designing durable security strategies. We are focusing a lot on crises these days (in fact ELIAMEP has launched a series of events entitled precisely ‘Crises in Focus’) but we should be doing the same for the other part of security: development.

Technology and Artificial Intelligence: The accelerator?

Technology shaped nearly every conversation. Artificial intelligence, cyber capabilities, digital infrastructure, and data governance are now integral to national power. Competitiveness in AI is by now established as a key source of strategic leverage, which allows states to ‘punch’ way above their size and to do so successfully. It has also changed irreversibly the nature of expertise that is required for geopolitical and foreign policy analysis, thus also becoming an important part of the conversation for the future of think tanks and policy advisory services.

Three undercurrents particularly stood out. First that technological sovereignty equals a degree of strategic autonomy: resilience in digital infrastructure is as fundamental as energy independence and military operational capacity. Second, that we stand at what is only the beginning of a major negotiation on the future of digital governance. From a European perspective, AI governance is seen as a mechanism for stability and for the upholding of fundamental human rights: without a governance framework with clear guardrails, AI-enabled disinformation, cyber disruption, and opaque military applications risk miscalculation. But to reconcile this with Mario Draghi’s urgency for global competitiveness, in a world of less or non-regulated actors, is a challenge. Finally, and related to global development, the AI divide has emerged as a strategic fault line: unequal access risks marginalizing countries and entrenching geopolitical inequality.

Details aside, the big question on everyone’s mind was: will technology set the agenda, or will it accelerate and support agenda setters?

Bringing it home: energy, connectivity and opportunities for Greece?

The Conference reaffirmed that energy and regional connectivity are central instruments of influence and security. European states are recalibrating energy sourcing, infrastructure, and cross-border supply chains to mitigate risk. Connectivity — from transport corridors to ports and digital networks — is not just economic facilitation; it is geopolitical leverage.

For Greece, these insights are particularly relevant. Its geographic position makes it a natural hub linking the Balkans, Eastern Mediterranean, and Middle East. Pipelines, LNG terminals, and interconnections with regional grids enhance both diplomatic leverage and energy resilience. Port and transport projects, including Piraeus and rail networks, strengthen Greece’s role as a regional hub for trade and strategic partnerships. Diversifying energy sources and linking energy and digital infrastructure amplifies national influence and mitigates vulnerability to external shocks. Engaging in multipolar diplomacy and regional connectivity initiatives allows Greece to build flexible coalitions that advance its foreign policy objectives while supporting EU strategic autonomy. Going back to one of the initial points made, multi-vector foreign policies are not just about diversifying partners, it is also about diversifying across policy areas, to raise leverage and set the agenda in as many fields as possible.

All in all, the MSC 2026 did not produce a grand doctrine. Instead, it revealed a world in transition. The international order is not collapsing outright (or under destruction as the catchy title of this year’s MSC publication framed the question). However, it is no longer comfortably anchored. The world is indeed witnessing some of its old assumptions falter. But it is also under renegotiation, and the stakes have never been clearer.

Photo: from the Munich Security Conference 2026 website

Green, circular buildings are crucial for climate change mitigation and resource efficiency, yet their employment impact in Sub-Saharan Africa remains unclear. This paper explores green job potential in Kigali, Rwanda—an urbanizing city with strong policy commitments and urgent housing needs. Employing a sequential mixed-methods design, we conducted 33 expert interviews and surveyed 546 firms across five construction value chain segments. We find that (1) many green jobs already exist, with 5.1% highly green and about 58% partly green based on practices performed; (2) green and circular practices are emerging through both policy support and grassroots innovation, (3) greening is positively, significantly correlated with employment growth for highly green firms, and (4) greening is significantly associated with improved job quality for all firms. Targeted support for firms in critical greening phases could boost job creation and quality. A mix of interventions is required to tackle cost competitiveness, skills and attitudes.

Green, circular buildings are crucial for climate change mitigation and resource efficiency, yet their employment impact in Sub-Saharan Africa remains unclear. This paper explores green job potential in Kigali, Rwanda—an urbanizing city with strong policy commitments and urgent housing needs. Employing a sequential mixed-methods design, we conducted 33 expert interviews and surveyed 546 firms across five construction value chain segments. We find that (1) many green jobs already exist, with 5.1% highly green and about 58% partly green based on practices performed; (2) green and circular practices are emerging through both policy support and grassroots innovation, (3) greening is positively, significantly correlated with employment growth for highly green firms, and (4) greening is significantly associated with improved job quality for all firms. Targeted support for firms in critical greening phases could boost job creation and quality. A mix of interventions is required to tackle cost competitiveness, skills and attitudes.

Green, circular buildings are crucial for climate change mitigation and resource efficiency, yet their employment impact in Sub-Saharan Africa remains unclear. This paper explores green job potential in Kigali, Rwanda—an urbanizing city with strong policy commitments and urgent housing needs. Employing a sequential mixed-methods design, we conducted 33 expert interviews and surveyed 546 firms across five construction value chain segments. We find that (1) many green jobs already exist, with 5.1% highly green and about 58% partly green based on practices performed; (2) green and circular practices are emerging through both policy support and grassroots innovation, (3) greening is positively, significantly correlated with employment growth for highly green firms, and (4) greening is significantly associated with improved job quality for all firms. Targeted support for firms in critical greening phases could boost job creation and quality. A mix of interventions is required to tackle cost competitiveness, skills and attitudes.

The reconstruction of Syria lacks a solid foundation, as Ahmad Al-Sharaa and his interim government prefer to establish facts rather than a social consensus. In his victory speech, al-Sharaa promised a social contract, but protection, provision and participation are still lacking. The interim government has fallen short of its responsibility in all three areas as evidenced by a series of violence including the forceful takeover of Kurdish-dominated territory in early 2026, large-scale investments without clear benefit for Syria’s suffering population, and polarized public discourse lacking genuine commitment to pluralism and tolerance. Social rifts are deep, including within the Syrian diaspora, which also requires a minimum of trust and security – so only some members of the diaspora may choose to engage with their homeland. The international community should not remain silent over these destabilizing developments in Syria’s domestic politics.

The reconstruction of Syria lacks a solid foundation, as Ahmad Al-Sharaa and his interim government prefer to establish facts rather than a social consensus. In his victory speech, al-Sharaa promised a social contract, but protection, provision and participation are still lacking. The interim government has fallen short of its responsibility in all three areas as evidenced by a series of violence including the forceful takeover of Kurdish-dominated territory in early 2026, large-scale investments without clear benefit for Syria’s suffering population, and polarized public discourse lacking genuine commitment to pluralism and tolerance. Social rifts are deep, including within the Syrian diaspora, which also requires a minimum of trust and security – so only some members of the diaspora may choose to engage with their homeland. The international community should not remain silent over these destabilizing developments in Syria’s domestic politics.

The reconstruction of Syria lacks a solid foundation, as Ahmad Al-Sharaa and his interim government prefer to establish facts rather than a social consensus. In his victory speech, al-Sharaa promised a social contract, but protection, provision and participation are still lacking. The interim government has fallen short of its responsibility in all three areas as evidenced by a series of violence including the forceful takeover of Kurdish-dominated territory in early 2026, large-scale investments without clear benefit for Syria’s suffering population, and polarized public discourse lacking genuine commitment to pluralism and tolerance. Social rifts are deep, including within the Syrian diaspora, which also requires a minimum of trust and security – so only some members of the diaspora may choose to engage with their homeland. The international community should not remain silent over these destabilizing developments in Syria’s domestic politics.

Dem Wiederaufbau Syriens fehlt das Fundament, denn Ahmad Al-Scharaa und seine Übergangsregierung schaffen lieber Fakten als einen gesellschaftlichen Konsens. In seiner Siegesrede versprach Al-Sharaa einen Gesellschaftsvertrag, doch Schutz, Daseinsvorsorge und die Möglichkeit bürgerlicher Teilhabe lassen weiterhin zu wünschen übrig. Die Übergangsregierung ist ihrer Verantwortung in allen drei Bereichen nicht nachgekommen. Das zeigen, erstens, das wiederholte Wiederaufflammen von Gewalt, darunter die gewaltsame Übernahme des kurdisch dominierten Gebiets Anfang 2026, zweitens, die groß angelegten Investitionen ohne klaren Nutzen für die notleidende Bevölkerung und, drittens, die polarisierte öffentliche Debatte ohne echtes Bekenntnis zu Pluralismus und Toleranz. Die sozialen Gräben sind tief, auch innerhalb der syrischen Diaspora. Mangels Vertrauen und Sicherheit wird nur ein Teil der Syrer im Ausland bereit sein sich, über Rücküberweisungen hinaus, für ihr Heimatland zu engagieren. Die internationale Gemeinschaft sollte zu diesen besorgniserregenden Entwicklungen in der syrischen Innenpolitik nicht schweigen.

Dem Wiederaufbau Syriens fehlt das Fundament, denn Ahmad Al-Scharaa und seine Übergangsregierung schaffen lieber Fakten als einen gesellschaftlichen Konsens. In seiner Siegesrede versprach Al-Sharaa einen Gesellschaftsvertrag, doch Schutz, Daseinsvorsorge und die Möglichkeit bürgerlicher Teilhabe lassen weiterhin zu wünschen übrig. Die Übergangsregierung ist ihrer Verantwortung in allen drei Bereichen nicht nachgekommen. Das zeigen, erstens, das wiederholte Wiederaufflammen von Gewalt, darunter die gewaltsame Übernahme des kurdisch dominierten Gebiets Anfang 2026, zweitens, die groß angelegten Investitionen ohne klaren Nutzen für die notleidende Bevölkerung und, drittens, die polarisierte öffentliche Debatte ohne echtes Bekenntnis zu Pluralismus und Toleranz. Die sozialen Gräben sind tief, auch innerhalb der syrischen Diaspora. Mangels Vertrauen und Sicherheit wird nur ein Teil der Syrer im Ausland bereit sein sich, über Rücküberweisungen hinaus, für ihr Heimatland zu engagieren. Die internationale Gemeinschaft sollte zu diesen besorgniserregenden Entwicklungen in der syrischen Innenpolitik nicht schweigen.

Dem Wiederaufbau Syriens fehlt das Fundament, denn Ahmad Al-Scharaa und seine Übergangsregierung schaffen lieber Fakten als einen gesellschaftlichen Konsens. In seiner Siegesrede versprach Al-Sharaa einen Gesellschaftsvertrag, doch Schutz, Daseinsvorsorge und die Möglichkeit bürgerlicher Teilhabe lassen weiterhin zu wünschen übrig. Die Übergangsregierung ist ihrer Verantwortung in allen drei Bereichen nicht nachgekommen. Das zeigen, erstens, das wiederholte Wiederaufflammen von Gewalt, darunter die gewaltsame Übernahme des kurdisch dominierten Gebiets Anfang 2026, zweitens, die groß angelegten Investitionen ohne klaren Nutzen für die notleidende Bevölkerung und, drittens, die polarisierte öffentliche Debatte ohne echtes Bekenntnis zu Pluralismus und Toleranz. Die sozialen Gräben sind tief, auch innerhalb der syrischen Diaspora. Mangels Vertrauen und Sicherheit wird nur ein Teil der Syrer im Ausland bereit sein sich, über Rücküberweisungen hinaus, für ihr Heimatland zu engagieren. Die internationale Gemeinschaft sollte zu diesen besorgniserregenden Entwicklungen in der syrischen Innenpolitik nicht schweigen.

Die Münchner Sicherheitskonferenz zeigt: Das transatlantische „Wir" ist nicht mehr selbstverständlich. Globale Ordnung muss neu verhandelt werden. Ein Gastbeitrag von Julia Leininger.

Die Münchner Sicherheitskonferenz zeigt: Das transatlantische „Wir" ist nicht mehr selbstverständlich. Globale Ordnung muss neu verhandelt werden. Ein Gastbeitrag von Julia Leininger.

Die Münchner Sicherheitskonferenz zeigt: Das transatlantische „Wir" ist nicht mehr selbstverständlich. Globale Ordnung muss neu verhandelt werden. Ein Gastbeitrag von Julia Leininger.

Dr Sophia Clément Mavroudis, former Professor at the École de guerre of the École Militaire in Paris and at Sciences Po, provides a concise analysis of the upcoming Greece-France Defense Agreement. Scheduled to be signed in spring 2026, the agreement establishes an enhanced framework for strategic military cooperation, significantly strengthening the defense capabilities of both countries.

Read the ELIAMEP Explainer here.

Africa has become import-dependent for staple food cereals over the past five decades. It is an ongoing dispute if increasing import dependency in Africa is causing food security risks for its population fueled by recent increases of uncertainties around international trade caused by geopolitical tensions and global trade policy disruptions. We call for an all-African approach based on regionally coordinated domestic support policies to increase Africa’s self-sufficiency and reduce international imports. We argue that the recent trend towards self-sufficiency as the overarching goal is not a sufficient strategy to improve food security because domestic support policies distort markets, increase prices, and set wrong incentives. Trade distorting policies risk undermining the benefits of regional and international trade for food security because often only trade can provide an efficient insurance mechanism against local supply shocks. A regional policy coordination is required for country-specific policy decisions framed by an all-African trade policy framework to balance production and imports primarily at the continental level. If a food self-sufficiency approach — for political reasons — is to be pursued, it should be in a way that is less distortive of the domestic and regional markets.

Africa has become import-dependent for staple food cereals over the past five decades. It is an ongoing dispute if increasing import dependency in Africa is causing food security risks for its population fueled by recent increases of uncertainties around international trade caused by geopolitical tensions and global trade policy disruptions. We call for an all-African approach based on regionally coordinated domestic support policies to increase Africa’s self-sufficiency and reduce international imports. We argue that the recent trend towards self-sufficiency as the overarching goal is not a sufficient strategy to improve food security because domestic support policies distort markets, increase prices, and set wrong incentives. Trade distorting policies risk undermining the benefits of regional and international trade for food security because often only trade can provide an efficient insurance mechanism against local supply shocks. A regional policy coordination is required for country-specific policy decisions framed by an all-African trade policy framework to balance production and imports primarily at the continental level. If a food self-sufficiency approach — for political reasons — is to be pursued, it should be in a way that is less distortive of the domestic and regional markets.