Europäische Union

Im Juni 2024 wurden Christina und Luca Hänni erstmals Eltern. Folgt bald das zweite Kind? In einer Instagram-Fragerunde geht die Tänzerin auf die Baby-Frage ein.

Der erste «FORZA! Trainer des Monats»-Award wurde vergeben! Mauro Lustrinelli wurde vom Blick und seiner Community zum besten Super-League-Trainer des Monats gewählt. Die Pokalübergabe fand feierlich in Thun statt.

Les juges ont rejeté les arguments des suspects selon lesquels l'affaire présentait des vices juridiques, permettant ainsi à l'enquête pour corruption de se poursuivre.

The post La Cour d’appel de Bruxelles refuse de suspendre l’enquête sur la corruption dans l’affaire Qatargate appeared first on Euractiv FR.

ENTWURF EINER STELLUNGNAHME zu dem Vorschlag für eine Verordnung des Europäischen Parlaments und des Rates zur Schaffung der Fazilität „Connecting Europe“ für den Zeitraum 2028-2034, zur Änderung der Verordnung (EU) 2024/1679 und zur Aufhebung der Verordnung (EU) 2021/1153
Ausschuss für Sicherheit und Verteidigung
Petras Auštrevičius

Quelle : © Europäische Union, 2026 - EP

Quelle : © Europäische Union, 2026 - EP

Am Freitag erscheint das sechste Album der britischen Folk-Rock-Band Mumford & Sons. «Prizefighter» erinnert stark an die Anfänge der Gruppe. Keystone-SDA hat mit dem Keyboarder Ben Lovett und dem Bassisten Ted Dwane gesprochen.

Quentin Griffiths, Mitgründer des Modehändlers Asos, starb nach einem Sturz aus dem 17. Stock seines Apartments in Thailand. Die Polizei untersucht, ob Fremdverschulden vorliegt.

Nach Krawallen beim YB-Spiel gegen Aston Villa und harten Strafen in England könnte die Schweiz nachziehen. Justizminister Beat Jans will Schnellrichterurteile prüfen, um Gewalt in Stadien effizienter zu ahnden.

Die ukrainische Polizei hat eine Agentengruppe aus Moldau festgenommen. Sie plante laut den Behörden, gezielte Tötungen von ukrainischen Politikern und Journalisten. Die Verdächtigen sammelten Informationen über ihre Opfer und warteten auf Befehle.

In December 2025, the European Commission published a communication entitled Strengthening EU economic security as a follow-up to its 2023 economic security strategy. Economic developments – whether related to trade, investment or industry – are increasingly viewed through the lens of security. From a foresight perspective, this development can be analysed as the result of three overlapping and partly reinforcing trends. The first is the weakening of a value-based approach to the economy, as exemplified by fair trade agreements and the EU Green Deal. The second is the rise of geo-economics, which places the interests of countries and regional blocks at the forefront, increasing the need for mitigating policies such as economic security. The third is the growing interaction between defence policy and economic policy, with military security influencing economic decisions and the defence sector growing in importance in the EU economy. This briefing argues that these combined trends are transforming the EU's economic policy and economy, and that the growing prominence of security as a guiding principle of economic and trade policies is bringing the question of EU strategic autonomy back to the centre of EU policy. Although the increasing importance of economic and defence security appears to be mutually reinforcing, with both trends potentially enhancing EU strategic autonomy, synergy between them is not a given. The raw materials and finances needed to reinforce the EU defence industrial base require a strong and open economy. However, concerns about foreign influence require economic decoupling from certain countries (e.g. Russia) and de-risking from others (e.g. China). Moreover, the EU faces unexpectedly difficult choices in its relations with the United States (US), where its dependence on US support in defence and security reduces its capacity to act independently as an economic player and rule-maker.
Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

Press briefing ahead of the upcoming Foreign Affairs Council will take place on 20 February 2026 at 15.00.

Press remarks by President António Costa following the meeting with Prime Minister of Norway, Jonas Gahr Støre in Oslo, Norway

Elena Lazarou, Director General, ELIAMEP

The 2026 Munich Security Conference gave the sense of a forum negotiating the terms of what comes next. The tone was measured, but the subtext was unmistakable: the assumptions that underpinned three decades of relative geopolitical coherence are eroding. What replaces them remains unsettled. On the positive side, it could be an opportunity.

Three core dynamics defining Munich this year were particularly interesting: transatlantic recalibration, the rising agency of middle powers and the Global South, and the expanding definition of security itself to match the geotechnological nature of our times. These trends are not new: they echo debates and concerns from previous years, but the discussion has evolved and the participants have matured and diversified.

Transatlantic Recalibration?

There was no open rupture between Europe and the United States. Yet neither was there a return to complacency. European leaders continue to affirm NATO’s centrality, yet strategic autonomy is no longer abstract rhetoric. From defense industrial capacity to energy diversification and digital infrastructure, Europe is hedging against systemic volatility. For the United States, alliance unity remains central but increasingly framed through domestic political sustainability – and domestic competition of identity related narratives. At the same time, for the European audience, one thing is clear: burden-sharing and alignment must be reciprocal and measurable. The transatlantic relationship is indeed recalibrating. And while the point was made that partnership endures; dependency does not.

Middle Powers and the Global South: From Participants to Architects?

No one knows dependency as well as some of what we now refer to as the middle powers of the ‘Global South’. Perhaps the most striking shift in this year’s Munich was not in what Western leaders said, but in who spoke with confidence. Middle powers — India, Brazil, the Gulf states — are no longer navigating between blocs; they are shaping the environment in which blocs operate. Their diplomacy is pragmatic and transactional. Engagement is diversified. Alignment is selective. This is now referred to by pundits as ‘multi-vector’ foreign policy and is increasingly appealing to states north and south. It could be argued that it is a return to what we once simply called ‘realist’.

Voices from Africa, Latin America, and parts of Asia present in the Bavarian capital underscored a structural gap (and not for the first time): global governance structures lag behind contemporary realities. Security debates emphasise defence and deterrence but still sideline debt distress, development financing, and climate vulnerability. In so doing, they do not resonate in much of the world.

For many of these countries, instability is fiscal, climatic, and demographic long before it manifests as military or territorial crises. Middle powers and Global South actors are asserting agency — and demanding that the architecture of order accommodate it.

One of the ‘quieter’ but consequential conversations focused on the intersection of development, humanitarian support, and security. Delegates from the Global South stressed that fragile states are destabilized not only by military threats, but by chronic underinvestment in infrastructure, social services, and governance. Humanitarian crises — from conflict-driven displacement to climate-induced food insecurity — are immediate pressures, but short-term aid alone cannot stabilize societies. But rather than just voicing concern, they also offered solutions, or at least proposals. An important one is that predictable development financing is preventive security. Long-term investment in education, health, energy, and infrastructure reduces the likelihood of crises escalating into broader regional instability.

On humanitarian support, experts from across the globe re-emphasized that it must complement, not replace, structural solutions. Emergency aid is essential to alleviate suffering, but without sustained development mechanisms, fragile states remain vulnerable to repeated shocks. Several voices emphasized that equitable financing, and mechanisms to address systemic vulnerabilities are critical to prevent recurring humanitarian crises. This is perhaps more important than ever, as the future of the United Nations and their reform enters the microscope – North and South. An opportunity is there, but a risk too. But the related conversations inside and outside closed doors highlighted a simple but often overlooked principle: stability is built before crises erupt, and humanitarian support is only one pillar in that architecture. Development and crisis response are inseparable in designing durable security strategies. We are focusing a lot on crises these days (in fact ELIAMEP has launched a series of events entitled precisely ‘Crises in Focus’) but we should be doing the same for the other part of security: development.

Technology and Artificial Intelligence: The accelerator?

Technology shaped nearly every conversation. Artificial intelligence, cyber capabilities, digital infrastructure, and data governance are now integral to national power. Competitiveness in AI is by now established as a key source of strategic leverage, which allows states to ‘punch’ way above their size and to do so successfully. It has also changed irreversibly the nature of expertise that is required for geopolitical and foreign policy analysis, thus also becoming an important part of the conversation for the future of think tanks and policy advisory services.

Three undercurrents particularly stood out. First that technological sovereignty equals a degree of strategic autonomy: resilience in digital infrastructure is as fundamental as energy independence and military operational capacity. Second, that we stand at what is only the beginning of a major negotiation on the future of digital governance. From a European perspective, AI governance is seen as a mechanism for stability and for the upholding of fundamental human rights: without a governance framework with clear guardrails, AI-enabled disinformation, cyber disruption, and opaque military applications risk miscalculation. But to reconcile this with Mario Draghi’s urgency for global competitiveness, in a world of less or non-regulated actors, is a challenge. Finally, and related to global development, the AI divide has emerged as a strategic fault line: unequal access risks marginalizing countries and entrenching geopolitical inequality.

Details aside, the big question on everyone’s mind was: will technology set the agenda, or will it accelerate and support agenda setters?

Bringing it home: energy, connectivity and opportunities for Greece?

The Conference reaffirmed that energy and regional connectivity are central instruments of influence and security. European states are recalibrating energy sourcing, infrastructure, and cross-border supply chains to mitigate risk. Connectivity — from transport corridors to ports and digital networks — is not just economic facilitation; it is geopolitical leverage.

For Greece, these insights are particularly relevant. Its geographic position makes it a natural hub linking the Balkans, Eastern Mediterranean, and Middle East. Pipelines, LNG terminals, and interconnections with regional grids enhance both diplomatic leverage and energy resilience. Port and transport projects, including Piraeus and rail networks, strengthen Greece’s role as a regional hub for trade and strategic partnerships. Diversifying energy sources and linking energy and digital infrastructure amplifies national influence and mitigates vulnerability to external shocks. Engaging in multipolar diplomacy and regional connectivity initiatives allows Greece to build flexible coalitions that advance its foreign policy objectives while supporting EU strategic autonomy. Going back to one of the initial points made, multi-vector foreign policies are not just about diversifying partners, it is also about diversifying across policy areas, to raise leverage and set the agenda in as many fields as possible.

All in all, the MSC 2026 did not produce a grand doctrine. Instead, it revealed a world in transition. The international order is not collapsing outright (or under destruction as the catchy title of this year’s MSC publication framed the question). However, it is no longer comfortably anchored. The world is indeed witnessing some of its old assumptions falter. But it is also under renegotiation, and the stakes have never been clearer.

Photo: from the Munich Security Conference 2026 website

Green, circular buildings are crucial for climate change mitigation and resource efficiency, yet their employment impact in Sub-Saharan Africa remains unclear. This paper explores green job potential in Kigali, Rwanda—an urbanizing city with strong policy commitments and urgent housing needs. Employing a sequential mixed-methods design, we conducted 33 expert interviews and surveyed 546 firms across five construction value chain segments. We find that (1) many green jobs already exist, with 5.1% highly green and about 58% partly green based on practices performed; (2) green and circular practices are emerging through both policy support and grassroots innovation, (3) greening is positively, significantly correlated with employment growth for highly green firms, and (4) greening is significantly associated with improved job quality for all firms. Targeted support for firms in critical greening phases could boost job creation and quality. A mix of interventions is required to tackle cost competitiveness, skills and attitudes.

Noch zu Beginn des Jahres suchte das Restaurant Wyhof in Sursee LU Verstärkung. Jetzt sind die Türen bereits geschlossen. Eine Baustelle treibt die Beiz in den Ruin. Sie ist dabei längstens nicht die einzige.

Wenn wir zwischendurch auf das Essen verzichten, aktivieren wir das Gen, das unsere Zellen repariert, Krankheiten vorbeugt und das Leben verlängert.

The Council designated the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps of Iran as a terrorist organization under the sanctions regime set out in Common Position 2001/931/CFSP (the so-called EU terrorist list).

ENTWURF EINES BERICHTS über die Empfehlung des Europäischen Parlaments an den Rat, die Kommission und die Vizepräsidentin der Kommission/Hohe Vertreterin der Union für Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik zu der Förderung der transnationalen Governance im Bereich Wasser im Interesse der Konfliktverhütung und des Friedens
Ausschuss für auswärtige Angelegenheiten
Leoluca Orlando

Quelle : © Europäische Union, 2026 - EP

Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

The High Representative issued a statement on behalf of the EU on the alignment of certain third countries with Council Decision (CFSP) 2026/260 of 29 January 2026 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia’s destabilising activities.