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La Médiatrice européenne Teresa Anjinho a ouvert mardi 23 septembre une enquête sur un échange de SMS entre la présidente de la Commission et le président français au sujet de l’accord commercial controversé conclu par l’UE avec les pays du Mercosur.

The post La Médiatrice européenne enquête sur les SMS échangés entre von der Leyen et Macron au sujet de l’accord UE-Mercosur appeared first on Euractiv FR.

Event Video 
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On September 23rd, IPI and the Government of Estonia, in partnership with the 1 for 8 Billion, the United Nations Association of the UK (UNA-UK), and CIVICUS, cohosted a public policy forum at the United Nations on the process of selecting the next UN secretary-general: the global diplomat and civil servant for the world’s peoples.

The event focused on recommendations to create a more transparent, inclusive, and equitable selection process for the position of UN secretary-general and ideas for how different sectors can work collaboratively to encourage and ensure the realization of this goal. The discussion also explored the increasing role of the General Assembly in the secretary-general’s election process. The event highlighted how this critical appointment can be a transformative and reinvigorating opportunity for the UN and for multilateralism as the world faces intersecting and accelerating global challenges.

Speakers:
H.E. Arnoldo André Tinoco, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Costa Rica
H.E. Jeppe Tranholm-Mikkelsen, Permanent Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of Denmark
H.E. Oana-Silvia Țoiu, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Romania
H.E. Gro Harlem Brundtland, Member of The Elders; former Prime Minister of Norway and Director-General of the WHO
Maria Noel Leoni, Representative of the 1 for 8 Billion Campaign; Co-founder and Campaign Director of GQUAL; and Deputy Executive Director for the Center for Justice and International Law (CEJIL)
Thant Myint-U, Visiting Fellow at Trinity College, Cambridge; the Chairman of U Thant House; Founder and Chairman of the Yangon Heritage Trust; and author of the book, Peacemaker: U Thant and the Forgotten Quest for a Just World

Closing Remarks:
H.E. Alar Karis, President of Estonia

Moderator:
Jeffrey Feltman, Non-Resident Adviser, International Peace Institute

The post A New Vision for Global Leadership: Selecting the Next UN Secretary-General appeared first on International Peace Institute.

Dauer des Videos : 75'

Haftungsausschluss : Die Verdolmetschung der Debatten soll die Kommunikation erleichtern, sie stellt jedoch keine authentische Aufzeichnung der Debatten dar. Authentisch sind nur die Originalfassungen der Reden bzw. ihre überprüften schriftlichen Übersetzungen.
Quelle : © Europäische Union, 2025 - EP

Discover the nominees for the European Parliament’s 2025 Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought.

Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

Le Conseil des ministres espagnol a approuvé mardi 23 septembre un décret-loi très attendu interdisant définitivement l’achat et la vente d’armes, de technologies à double usage et d’équipements militaires à Israël.

The post L’Espagne officialise l’embargo total sur les armes à destination d’Israël appeared first on Euractiv FR.

Dauer des Videos : 60'

Haftungsausschluss : Die Verdolmetschung der Debatten soll die Kommunikation erleichtern, sie stellt jedoch keine authentische Aufzeichnung der Debatten dar. Authentisch sind nur die Originalfassungen der Reden bzw. ihre überprüften schriftlichen Übersetzungen.
Quelle : © Europäische Union, 2025 - EP

Kairo untergrabe genau die Organisation, deren Führung es anstrebt, sagt ein griechischer Europaabgeordneter

Après vingt-cinq ans d’efforts pour réduire sa dépendance aux combustibles fossiles, l’Allemagne se retrouve à un moment charnière de sa transition énergétique. Berlin doit décider s’il faut continuer à accorder de généreuses subventions aux énergies renouvelables ou bien revoir un système que certains jugent responsable de la perte de compétitivité industrielle du pays.

The post Transition énergétique : l’Allemagne à la croisée des chemins appeared first on Euractiv FR.

A múlt héten csütörtökön legalább 500 000 ember vonult az utcára egy nagy szakszervezeti akció keretében – miközben a miniszterelnök ----> tovább olvasok!

The post Csak a szokásos: tüntetés, sztrájk, a kormány nehéz helyzetben appeared first on FRANCIA POLITIKA.

La Commission européenne souhaite repousser une nouvelle fois l’entrée en vigueur de la loi anti-déforestation de l’UE, qui avait déjà été reportée d’un an en 2024.

The post Bruxelles s’apprête à proposer un nouveau report des règles anti-déforestation appeared first on Euractiv FR.

A Nemzetgyűlés tavalyi feloszlatása kapcsán több alkalommal is elmondtam azt a lehetséges forgatókönyvet, hogy Emmanuel Macron köztársasági elnök esetleg arra ----> tovább olvasok!

The post Amikor Macron Bardella-kormányt akart appeared first on FRANCIA POLITIKA.

Wenige Stunden zuvor hatte die Kommission die Verhandlungen über ein Freihandelsabkommen mit Indonesien, dem weltweit größten Exporteur von Palmöl – einer Kulturpflanze, die in den letzten Jahrzehnten maßgeblich zur Entwaldung beigetragen hat – abgeschlossen

As part of the ReArm Europe Plan, the measures aim to strengthen Europe’s defence technological and industrial base by channelling EU funding to defence and security.
Committee on Industry, Research and Energy

Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

As part of the ReArm Europe Plan, the measures aim to strengthen Europe’s defence technological and industrial base by channelling EU funding to defence and security.
Committee on Industry, Research and Energy

Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

As part of the ReArm Europe Plan, the measures aim to strengthen Europe’s defence technological and industrial base by channelling EU funding to defence and security.
Committee on Industry, Research and Energy

Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

As part of the ReArm Europe Plan, the measures aim to strengthen Europe’s defence technological and industrial base by channelling EU funding to defence and security.
Committee on Industry, Research and Energy

Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

Un acteur non identifié mais « compétent » est derrière le survol, lundi 22 septembre, de drones au-dessus de l’aéroport de Copenhague — un incident vu par la Première ministre danoise comme « la pire attaque contre les infrastructures critiques danoises à ce jour ».

The post « Un acteur compétent » derrière les drones repérés au-dessus de l’aéroport de Copenhague appeared first on Euractiv FR.

Lundi 22 septembre, une grève générale a été organisée en Italie par des syndicats de gauche contre le « génocide en Palestine » et les livraisons d’armes italiennes à Israël.

The post Italie : mobilisation massive en soutien à Gaza appeared first on Euractiv FR.

The Security Action for Europe (SAFE) Programme is the new EU financial instrument designed to allow EU Member States to speed up their defence readiness by enabling urgent and significant investments in support of the European defence industry, with a focus on filling critical gaps in capabilities and equipment. It is the first pillar of the ReArm Europe Plan/Readiness 2030 strategic plan that aims to unlock €800 billion in defence spending across the EU.[1]

SAFE will provide up to €150 billion in competitive long-maturity loans to Member States that request financial assistance for investments in defence capabilities. These loans will finance urgent and large-scale procurement processes, ensuring that Europe’s defence industry can deliver the requisite equipment.

The features expected of the submitted proposals

The proposals should be:

• Relevant to the defence capabilities of Member States and the EU (e.g. border protection, countering hybrid threats, protecting critical infrastructure, countering cyber warfare, etc.)
• For urgent, large-scale procurement efforts, not small projects
• Involve at least two Member States in a common procurement procedure
• However, requests from individual Member States can also be approved, but only if they are linked to an urgent need and broader geopolitical realities; the proposal must also be submitted on the basis of the timely procurement and delivery of critical assets[2] (for example, the need to procure drones to counter migration movements along routes experiencing a significant increase in traffic, or systems to protect critical infrastructure from potential terrorist threats linked to the situation in the Middle East, could be supported). This is a temporary exception with an initial duration of one year.
• In addition, no more than 35% of the cost of the products’ manufacturing components can originate from outside the EU, EEA-EFTA, or Ukraine, while the countries of origin must meet the conditions set out in the Programme Regulations.

What will SAFE fund?

Category 1:

• Ammunition and missiles
• Artillery systems, including deep-precision strike capabilities
• Ground combat capabilities and their support systems, including soldier equipment and infantry weapons
• Small drones (NATO 1 class[3]) and related anti-drone systems
• Systems and equipment for critical infrastructure protection
• Cyber defence and cyber security systems
• Military mobility, including counter-mobility

Category 2:

• Air and missile defence systems
• Maritime surface and underwater capabilities
• Drones other than small drones (NATO-2 and NATO-3 class) and related anti-drone systems
• Strategic enablers such as, but not limited to, strategic airlift, air-to-air refuelling, C4ISTAR systems (Command, Communications, Information, Control, etc.), as well as space assets and services
• Space asset protection systems
• Artificial intelligence and electronic warfare systems

Countries that have expressed an interest in participating in SAFE and a Timeline for the Next Steps

By 29 July 2025, when the Programme’s first key deadline expired, 19 Member States had expressed an interest in accessing loans through the SAFE mechanism, with potential defence purchases of at least €127 billion.

The Member States in question are Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia and Spain.

The following resources have been tentatively allocated to the Member States as follows:

Member-State Allocation of Resources (€) Belgium 8,340,027,698 Bulgaria 3,261,700,000 Croatia 1,700,000,000 Cyprus 1,181,503,924 Czech Republic 2,060,000,000 Denmark 46,796,822 Estonia 2,660,932,171 Finland 1,000,000,000 France 16,216,720,524 Greece 787,669,283 Hungary 16,216,720,524 Italy 14,900,000,000 Latvia 5,680,431,322 Lithuania 6,375,487,840 Poland 43,734,100,805 Portugal 5,841,179,332 Romania 16,680,055,394 Slovakia 2,316,674,361 Spain 1,000,000,000

 

30 November 2025 Submission of National Defence Investment Plans

January 2026 Adoption of Council Implementing Decisions

February 2026: Negotiation of loan agreements and operational arrangements, triggering pre-financing.

In search of a European strategic culture and interoperability: Behind the Lines

1. The Programme is part of the EU’s overall strategy on the indivisibility of external and internal security—a strategy which informs every strategic and institutional document it produces in relation to internal and foreign policy. SAFE follows in the wake of the wars in Ukraine and the Middle East, but also the intensification of hybrid threats. It is therefore to be expected that it bears the imprint of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine as well Moscow’s hybrid attacks against Ukraine and its hybrid operations against EU Member States. Apart from blurring the lines between war and peace—which is a key characteristic of hybrid threats in general—, the specific threat posed by Russia highlights the extent to which internal security is now significantly threatened by a malicious external actor, which can also be a state. This constitutes a further significant change in the recognition and assessment of threats.
2. The main threats that can be addressed through projects submitted to SAFE for funding extend beyond military attack by a hostile nation to include hybrid threats, cyber-attacks, the weaponization of migration and mass border breaches, terrorist attacks, malicious acts, and the sabotaging of critical infrastructure. Which is to say, precisely those threats that are stressed in the broader strategic and political philosophy underpinning the new EU defence policy, mainly via the White Paper on European Defence Preparedness 2030.
3. This works in tandem with the EU Preparedness Union Strategy, which sets out an integrated approach to every threat to the Union’s preparedness for conflict, anthropogenic and natural disasters and crises, the White Paper on European Defence Preparedness 2030, and the Internal Security Strategy: Protecting the EU.
4. SAFE emphasizes investment in the protection and resilience of critical infrastructure/entities, cyberspace, borders, transport, supply chains, information and communication technologies, as well as space investments, technologies and facilities. It is worth noting that most Member States are in the process of transposing the Directive on the Resilience of Critical Entities into national law and developing related strategies.
5. SAFE is a Programme that can further enhance interoperability between the armed and security forces, as well as dual use in the defence / security / civil protection sectors in line with the framework put in place by the EU Preparedness Union Strategy to prevent and react to emerging threats and crises—in particular those in the areas of hybrid threats, border protection, the resilience of critical infrastructure, and cyber security.
6. It can act as a bottom-up catalyst for the emergence of a European strategic culture in both threat identification and investment planning; for the creation of collaborative economies of scale; and for the increased interoperability of assets and systems on the basis of a common European defence capability. This procedure has been followed in other cases where there were difficulties reaching an agreement at the Council level—for example, in the prevention of radicalization. However, there is always the risk that the absence of a statutory coordinating body could lead to fragmented proposals that simply reproduce the various strategic cultures and assessments of risk. Let’s hope that this time, the glass is half-full.

 

[1] For details on SAFE, see the relevant EXPLAINER by S. Blavoukas and P. Politis-Lamprou at https://www.eliamep.gr/wp-content/uploads/2025/05/EXPLAINER-4-EL.pdf. More generally, on the European Defence Fund and the EU Defence Industrial Ecosystem, see S. Blavoukos; P. Politis-Lamprou and G. Matsoukas at https://www.eliamep.gr/wp-content/uploads/2025/06/Policy-paper-182-Blavoukos-Politis-Matsoukas-FINAL-EL.pdf

[2] https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-defence-industry/safe-security-action-europe_en

[3] The classification is based on their weight and the altitude they can reach under normal conditions. Specifically, they are:
Class I: small>20 kg; mini 2-20 kg, micro<2kg
Class II: 150-600 kg (regular)
Class III: >600 kg with three subcategories (strike, HALE, MALE).
On the categories, and more generally on NATO’s approach to unmanned aerial vehicles, see Joint Air Power Competence Centre https://www.japcc.org/

Ein Flug der Scandinavian Airlines mit der Vizepräsidentin der Europäischen Kommission, Roxana Mînzatu, an Bord musste gestern Abend nach Schweden umgeleitet werden, nachdem der Flughafen Kopenhagen aufgrund von Drohnen-Sichtungen geschlossen worden war. In einem separaten Vorfall meldete auch der Flughafen Oslo Drohnenaktivitäten.