Balkans Occidentaux

La signature d'un accord pour l'exploration d'hydrocarbures en mer Ionienne marque une nouvelle étape dans la stratégie énergétique grecque. Derrière les promesses économiques, les organisations de défense de l'environnement s'inquiètent.

- Le fil de l'Info / Une - Diaporama, Courrier des Balkans, Environnement dans les Balkans, Grèce, Environnement

By Anis Chowdhury
SYDNEY, Apr 21 2026 (IPS)

The global economy, is at the precipice of “stagflation” – growth slowdown and higher inflation – due to the energy price shock following the illegal US-Israel war on Iran. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has recently termed this as a “textbook negative supply shock”. For the first time since the 1970s, the prospect of stagflation seems real.

Anis Chowdhury

What can central bankers learn from the 1970s stagflation?

Prospects of global stagflation

The IMF simulated three possible macroeconomic scenarios depending on the duration of this conflict and the extent of damages to energy infrastructure in the region. These range from a marginal drop in this year’s forecast global growth rate – from 3.4% to 3.1% – to a moderate decline to 2.5% and a sharp decline to 2%. The projected spikes in “headline inflation” – covering all goods and services, including volatile items, e.g., energy and food – range from 4.4% to 5.8% in 2026.

The IMF rightly doubts whether inflation can be checked with monetary tightening without causing substantial increase in unemployment. But it does not offer any solutions; instead advises the central banks to remain ready “to act decisively to maintain price stability”.

The IMF’s overall policy advice is conservative. However, it acknowledges the need for monetary and fiscal policy to support economic activities if the if financial conditions tighten sharply and global activity deteriorates markedly.

Inflation phobia and policy over-reaction

Ben Bernanke and his co-researchers found that the recession in the 1970s did not result from the oil-price shocks “per se, but from the resulting tightening of monetary policy”. Bob Barsky and Lutz Kilian found “that the oil price increases were not nearly as essential a part of the causal mechanism generating the stagflation of the 1970s as is often thought”. Ed Nelson blamed central banks’ “faulty doctrine” for the 1970s stagflation.

So, it was not inflation that caused output to decline, but rather, inappropriate and draconian efforts to curb inflation that inevitably repressed growth, and produced world’s first stagflation. This may happen again if central bankers overreact and tighten the financial conditions to kill the current “textbook supply shock” inflation.

The problem is the central bankers’ dogmatic group-thinking despite contrary empirical evidence. For example, the fear of unhinged inflation expectations and wage-price spirals do not have any empirical basis as reported in IMF research and the Australia’s Reserve Bank.

Yet, the central bankers and the IMF favour monetary tightening fearing the risk of “unhinged” inflation expectations and wage-price spirals.

Revisiting the inflation target

The central bankers’ group-thinking bias insists on an inflation target of 2% – a figure “plucked out of the air”, yet became “global economic gospel”. Don Brash, the acclaimed former Governor of the Reserve Bank of New Zealand, who was the first central bank governor to adopt a 2% inflation target admitted that it was based on a chance remark by then New Zealand Finance Minister Roger Douglas “during the course of a television interview”. It became “the mantra, repeated endlessly” as Brash and his colleagues “devoted a huge amount of effort” to preaching his new gospel “to everybody who would listen – and some who were reluctant to listen”.

Olivier Blanchard, the IMF’s former Chief Economist, questioned the wisdom behind the 2% inflation target and argued for a higher, e.g., 4% target following the 2008-2009 global financial crisis. IMF research also advocated for a long-run inflation target of 4%. Such a moderately higher inflation should widen policy space.

Joe Gagnon and Chris Collins argued that “the case for raising the inflation target is stronger” than it is usually thought. Their research revealed that “the benefits [of a higher inflation target] clearly exceed the costs”.

Thus, one should not be surprised when The Financial Times says, “It is time to revisit the 2% inflation target”.

Rethinking inflation

Almost all central bankers see inflation as an outcome of excess demand, caused by either an increase in aggregate demand or a decrease in aggregate supply at a given price. Prices rise to eliminate the excess demand.

A common view is that higher prices lead to demand for higher wages which in turn cause higher prices, thus generating wage-price spirals. Therefore, central bankers focus on containing demand by raising interest rate regardless of the sources of inflation.

On the other hand, optimal policy-mix differ when inflation is seen as the result of a distributional conflict or disagreement. Guido Lorenzoni and Iv´an Werning analysed the impacts of supply shocks arising from “non-labour” inputs, such as energy under the different relative bargaining powers of labour and firms where the non-labour input price is perfectly flexible, and goods prices are more flexible than wages.

They found that the optimal policy response to a supply shock coming from the scarce non-labour input is to “run the economy hot”, i.e., to allow demand to exceed supply capacity and higher inflation. Their findings imply that it would be more efficient to reach the adjustment with the help of higher price inflation than through lower price inflation and deeper wage deflation by causing higher unemployment.

David Ratner and Jae Sim analysed the trade-off of anti-inflationary measures considering inflation as an outcome of distributional conflict. They found that restrictive anti-inflationary measures are more costly in terms of unemployment.

Interestingly, their finding corroborates the IMF’s observation that the aggregate supply curve has become flatter making restrictive anti-inflationary measures more costly in terms of higher unemployment. Unfortunately, the central bankers’ anti-inflation group bias dismisses the higher unemployment or growth declines due to restrictive policies as “short-term pains for long-term gains”.

Recent IMF research revealed permanent scars of recessions, including those arising from external shocks and macroeconomic policy mistakes; they all “lead to permanent losses in output and welfare”. The Lancet reported “substantial effects on suicide rates”. The Body Economic: Why Austerity Kills, investigated the human cost of austerity policies during economic crises to emphasise that health indicators can significantly deteriorate.

Optimal policy response

In light of the above, the central bankers should reconsider their hawkish anti-inflationary policy-setting.

The governments around the world are trying to ease fuel-price impacts by fiscal measures such as a temporary reduction of fuel excise duty, subsidies and price caps. The mainstream commentators, including the IMF, argue that these measures may have significant fiscal costs if the crisis lingers on, and would put extra-burden on central banks, which are focused on controlling inflation.

Significantly, the optimal policy-mix should include tax revenue raising measures. Governments should consider enhancing tax progressivity. In particular, an excess profit tax should be imposed on the beneficiaries of higher interest rates and fuel prices, such as banks and fuel companies to fund cost of living support measures.

Dr. Ken Henry, Australia’s former Treasury Secretary has recently argued that a 100% tax on windfall profits from gas would be “socially optimal”. Tony Wood held “A windfall profit tax may be the least-worst solution to the gas crisis”.

Research based on US data reveals that an excess profit tax reduces existing racial and ethnic inequalities and inequalities between groups with different educational attainments. It can also accelerate renewable energy transition when increasing geopolitical tensions and climate impacts threaten continued volatility in fossil fuel and gas markets.

Anis Chowdhury, Emeritus Professor, Western Sydney University (Australia). He held senior UN positions in Bangkok and New York and served as Special Assistant to the Chief Advisor for Finance (with the status and rank of State Minister) in the Professor Yunus-led Interim Government. E-mail: anis.z.chowdhury@gmail.com

IPS UN Bureau

 

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A sea turtle is released from the hatchery in Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh to begin its hazardous journey to the sea. Credit: UNDP Bangladesh

By Rafiqul Islam
COX'S BAZAR, Bangladesh, Apr 20 2026 (IPS)

Every winter thousands of sea turtles come ashore at Cox’s Bazar, in the Bay of Bengal, Bangladesh, to lay eggs.

Their path to their breeding grounds is hazardous – fishing nets, propellers, light pollution, coastal developments, stray dogs and other dangers conspire against their success.

The area is rich in biodiversity, with five out of seven ancient reptiles present in Bangladesh’s waters, with three – the Olive Ridley (Lepidochelys olivacea), the Green Turtle (Chelonia mydas), and the Hawksbill (Eretmochelys imbricata) – coming ashore for nesting.

Stefan Liller, UNDP Bangladesh representative, gently releases the young turtles from the hatchery. Credit: UNDP Bangladesh

Amid such unfavourable odds for the aquatic creatures, a group of young people volunteer to protect the turtles on the beach at Cox’s Bazar during the breeding season from November to March, contributing to their successful conservation.

“In the past, we did not know how sea turtles help conserve marine ecosystems. Now we know sea turtles play an important role in conserving biodiversity,” Rezaul Karim, a resident of Shafir Beel village in Cox’s Bazar, told Inter Press Service (IPS).

Karim is one of the youths trained for sea turtle conservation under a project run by the Arannayk Foundation, a non-profit conservation organisation in Bangladesh. The foundation established a sea turtle conservation group involving 25 local youths (11 women, 14 men) under its Ecosystem Awareness and Restoration Through Harmony (EARTH) project. EARTH is supported by the Forest Department, the Department of Environment (DoE), and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) with funding from the Global Environment Facility (GEF).

A youth group performs a play designed to sensitise the community to conservation issues. Credit: Arannayk Foundation

The group is working to raise awareness about sea turtle conservation among fishermen, youth, and the local community. They are also aiming to encourage a shift in local attitudes by engaging community members.

Group leader Delwar Hossain, a resident of Sonarpara village under Ukhyia upazila, said sea turtles play a crucial role in maintaining marine ecosystems, as different species of sea turtles help sweep or clean the ocean by managing various food sources and habitats.

He said there is a superstition among the marine fishermen that if turtles are caught in their fishing gear, it will bring bad luck and that is why they kill turtles caught in their nets.

“We held meetings with the fishermen several times and made them aware of sea turtle conservation,” Delwar said.

Turtle conservation group leader Delwar Hossain with others on Cox’s Bazar Beach, Bangladesh. Credit: Rafiqul Islam/IPS

Gabriella Richardson Temm, Lead of the Small Grants Program at the GEF, says civil society, Indigenous Peoples, local communities, and youth and women groups around the world “play critical roles in shaping global development agendas. They deliver transformational solutions to global environmental problems, bring rights holders and marginalised voices into national policy dialogues, and elevate local priorities in international environmental negotiations and financing.”

Indigenous Peoples, local communities, and youth and women groups around the world play critical roles in shaping global development agendas.

The small grants program has served as a cornerstone of civil society engagement within the GEF partnership since its inception in 1992.

“Over three decades, the program has demonstrated remarkable reach and impact, administering over US$1.5 billion through nearly 30,000 grants to Indigenous Peoples, local communities, women, and youth across 136 countries. This extensive network has successfully secured US$990 million in co-financing, demonstrating the program’s effectiveness in mobilising additional resources for environmental action at the grassroots level,” says Temm.

Grassroots community protection has been acknowledged as contributing to the success of moving one of the sea turtles – the green turtle – to the International Union for Cons

ervation of Nature’s (IUCN) ‘Least Concern’ list. Other factors include international trade bans, reduced poaching, and improved fishing gear.

However, the species predominantly nesting in the Cox’s Bazar beaches, the Olive Ridley is classified as ‘Vulnerable’ on the IUCN Red List of Threatened Species, while the Hawksbill Turtle remains ‘Critically Endangered’ due to population declines.

Many sea turtles don’t survive the hazardous journey to the nesting grounds at Cox’s Bazar Beach, Bangladesh. Credit: Bangladesh Forest Department

Establishment of Turtle Hatchery

In Cox’s Bazar, with the help of the foundation, the youth group surveyed a 10 km stretch from Reju Khal to Balia Khali beach to identify sea turtle nesting sites. It also gathered insights from local communities on sea turtle breeding seasons, nesting frequency, preferred locations, and community perceptions regarding conservation.

Following the assessment, a sea turtle hatchery was established in Boro Inani, Cox’s Bazar. The hatchery is now playing a crucial conservation role, as these statistics show.

Between January and April 2024, 5,878 Olive Ridley eggs were collected from various nests at Swankhali, Ruppati, Imamer Deil, and Madarbunia sea beaches, resulting in 3,586 hatchlings hatching, with an average hatching success of 61 percent.

Also, from February to April 2025, a total of 3,199 eggs were collected, and by May 2025, 716 hatchlings had been released.

Stefan Liller, UNDP Bangladesh representative in the turtle hatchery. Credit: UNDP Bangladesh

Delwar said that stray dogs often eat the turtle eggs so the hatchery makes a significant contribution.

“We collect eggs that turtles release on the shore and bring those to the hatchery for hatching. Besides, we ask the community people to give turtle eggs to the hatchery. We, the group members, collect the turtle eggs from them too.”

Nurul Afsar, another TCG member, said many ethnic communities living in Cox’s Bazar consume turtles and their eggs – so the group plays a role in encouraging them not to consume but instead protect them.

ABM Sarowar Alam, program manager (species and habitats) at the IUCN in Bangladesh, said Cox’s Bazar Beach was once the ideal breeding ground for sea turtles, but it has dwindled due to habitat loss, poaching, and human disturbance.

He believes that several areas of the beach should be declared as “protected areas for sea turtles” to ensure safe breeding and that fishing should be restricted in the canals connecting to the sea so that turtles can move freely for nesting.

The group also addresses other hazards, such as the issue of stray dogs that kill the turtles and consume the eggs.

Firoz Al Amin, range officer of Inani Forest Range in Ukhiya, said the Forest Department has been working to control the stray dogs on the beach, aiming to protect the turtles.

A sea turtle moves toward the sea. Local conservationists are making a difference to the future of these ancient aquatic animals. Credit: UNDP Bangladesh

EARTH Project, More Than Turtle Conservation

Dr Mohammed Muzammel Hoque, national coordinator of the GEF Small Grants Program at UNDP Bangladesh, said the EARTH project’s role went beyond turtle conservation in the region.

It has elephant-response teams to mitigate conflicts between elephants and humans. The Five Crab Conservation Groups (CCG), comprising 25 youth members, and five sea Turtle Conservation Groups (TCG), also consisting of 25 youth members, remain active. The project was also working towards restoring habitats, with over 7,780 seedlings planted with support from the EARTH Project, with around 80% surviving.

However, Hoque said that the success is dependent on funding – and it’s hoped that once a Forest Trail becomes operational, it can generate revenue from tourists.

Abu Hena Mostafa Kamal, program coordinator of the Arannayk Foundation, said the project, by integrating livelihoods with conservation, “helped grow a sense of ownership among community members and youth, ensuring that environmental protection is not just a project outcome but a sustained, collective commitment.”

Note: The Eighth Global Environment Facility Assembly will be held from May 30 to June 6, 2026 in Samarkand, Uzbekistan.

This feature is published with the support of the GEF. IPS is solely responsible for the editorial content, and it does not necessarily reflect the views of the GEF.

IPS UN Bureau Report

 

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Tirana a accueilli mi-avril le IVe Sommet de la diaspora albanaise. Entre grand messe patriotique, exode constant de la population d'Albanie et accueil d'une personnalité controversée comme l'ancien maire de New York Eric Adams, les résultats concrets se font toujours attendre.

- Articles / Albanie, Courrier des Balkans, Société, Populations, minorités et migrations, Exode

Tirana a accueilli mi-avril le IVe Sommet de la diaspora albanaise. Entre grand messe patriotique, exode constant de la population d'Albanie et accueil d'une personnalité controversée comme l'ancien maire de New York Eric Adams, les résultats concrets se font toujours attendre.

- Articles / Albanie, Courrier des Balkans, Société, Populations, minorités et migrations, Exode, Une - Diaporama

Climate-related extreme weather events are increa-singly displacing communities across Southern Africa, with negative implications for social cohesion, livelihoods, and community resilience. Understanding how displacement erodes social cohesion is important for developing strategies for restoring it. Evidence shows that livelihood support interventions, for example, cash‑based assistance, in-kind transfers (agricultural inputs) up to skills development programmes, are a pathway for mending or strengthening social cohesion in displacement contexts. Yet, in some cases, they can further fragment it. This requires strategies under which such interventions can be deployed to positively shape social cohesion outcomes.
This Policy Brief synthesises insights from qualitative research conducted from 2023 to 2025 with displaced communities and host populations in Zimbabwe (Chimanimani and Tsholotsho districts) and Mozambique (Guara Guara, Grudja and Praia Nova). It examines how livelihood interventions can either rebuild or further fragment social cohesion, identifies critical factors driving cohesion outcomes, and provides evidence-based recommendations for national governments, humanitarian actors, and development co-operation actors working in climate-displacement contexts across Southern Africa.
In Zimbabwe, vertical social cohesion in displacement contexts is eroded by a lack of designated policies on displacement, leading to poor socioeconomic outcomes for displaced individuals; ad hoc recovery and reconstruction efforts that undermine durable solutions and long-term recovery; and a lack of accountability infrastructure that undermines trust in the government. In Mozambique, the slow implementation and unequal distribution of recovery interventions undermine cooperation between communities and the institutions involved in post-disaster recovery efforts. This has led to large-scale returns of people to high-risk areas.
Drawing insights from both case studies, we provide key recommendations and conditions for implementing livelihood support to achieve social cohesion in climate-related displacement contexts.
Key policy messages
• Livelihood interventions can lead to maladaptation if not supported by strong governance mechanisms including policy frameworks and institutional coordination in planning and implementation.
• People-centred, area-based approaches to livelihood programming that account for pre-displacement livelihoods and support post-displacement transitions, while benefiting both displaced populations and host communities, should be adopted. One-size-fits-all interventions risk undermining economic recovery and social cohesion.
• Horizontal and vertical social cohesion indicators should be embedded in livelihood programmes from the outset to assess the social impacts before and after implementation.
• Inclusive, participatory decision-making in the delivery of livelihood support programmes should be mandated to prevent exclusionary practices that erode trust in institutions.

Dr Tomy Ncube is a postdoctoral researcher affiliated with the Centre for International Development Innovation at the Ryan Institute, University of Galway, and the School of Geography, Archaeology and Irish Studies.

This policy brief offers advice for making digital remote work a viable solution to fill labour gaps without requiring workers to physically relocate. From a technology standpoint, there is no reason someone who does computer-based work must physically relocate, assuming they have the required job skills and internet connectivity. The increased use of bilateral labour agreements (BLAs) between countries is evidence that there are major skills gaps and global competition for labour. Indeed, a BLA can serve as a “policy sandbox” where governments negotiate the legal and statutory terms of digital remote work. Digital remote work can be an especially useful solution when the country providing labour has a large pool of people who are willing to work and fill labour pool gaps in countries of employment, but for different legal or personal reasons cannot relocate across borders. This latter point is no small thing: there is a significant body of migration research showing that the majority of people are not interested in moving across borders – or in the case of many refugees are unable to do so. The reasons for this are myriad. Digital labour could be a workaround to meet basic labour demand and facilitate economic inclusion. The word “could” is critical because banking, social and health insurance, and taxation, all of which are components of legal employment, remain bordered. This policy brief will focus on a specific case from research on urban refugee livelihoods where the worker was able to work digitally in the U.S. from Malaysia, while being subject to social security, taxation and insurance in the U.S. The idiosyncrasies in this case help point to spaces for reforming social security, tax and insurance rules to reduce their “bordered-ness” and make digital work more systematically viable.
Key policy messages:
• To make digital remote work viable at scale, development cooperation agencies should play a key facilitator role, linking relevant authorities in the tax, social insurance and banking regulation sectors. This is especially important for refugees, who often cannot move and who fall outside the protection of host country labour laws. These reforms could, for example, be built into BLAs.
• Achieving inclusive economic development goals via digital employment would require that remote workers earned competitive salaries. Thus, there would need to be buy-in from the private sector regarding wage competitiveness for workers in different countries, as well as a role for unions and civil society in negotiating digital remote work policy.
• While digital work can enable greater economic and labour participation for workers who cannot relocate for jobs, there are still sectors that require physical presence. Thus, digital remote work is not a replacement for immigration policy that facilitates safe and flexible migration for those people who do have to move.

Bonn, 20. April 2026. Der Umbau unserer Städte braucht mehr als CO2-armen Zement. Bio-Materialien können Emissionen senken, Arbeitsplätze und lokale Wirtschaftskreisläufe stärken – aber werden oft übersehen. 

Vom 20. - 22. April suchen Vertreter*innen aus Wissenschaft, Politik und Industrie auf dem Sustainable Buildings and Construction Summit in Lausanne nach Lösungen zur Dekarbonisierung der bebauten Umwelt. Der Druck ist enorm. Der Gebäudesektor verursacht jährlich mehr als ein Drittel der globalen CO2-Emissionen, während die Urbanisierung in vielen Ländern mit niedrigem und mittlerem Einkommen rasant wächst – besonders in Subsahara-Afrika. Entscheidend ist, ob Lösungen schnell verfügbar und realisierbar sind und wirtschaftliche Vorteile bieten. International gilt CO2-armer Beton wie LC3 häufig als schnelle Lösung, weil er kaum Verfahrensanpassungen braucht. Wirtschaftliche Impulse sind jedoch begrenzt – sie könnten wachsen, wenn biobasierte Materialien den Baumix ergänzen.

Viele Länder in Subsahara-Afrika stehen vor drei Herausforderungen. Erstens müssen sie Wohnraum für eine schnell wachsende, oft einkommensschwache Stadtbevölkerung schaffen. Bereits heute fehlen ca. 50 Millionen Wohneinheiten; bis 2030 könnten es 130 Millionen sein. Zweitens steht die Schaffung von Arbeitsplätzen im Zentrum politischer Agenden. In Kenia etwa drängt jährlich rund eine Million junge Menschen auf den Arbeitsmarkt. Drittens geht es darum, die wirtschaftliche Entwicklung auf einen umweltfreundlicheren Pfad zu lenken. Infrastruktur und Gebäude machen diese Weichenstellung besonders folgenreich: CO2-intensives Bauen verschlechtert die Emissionsbilanz, heizt die Städte auf und erschwert die Wiederverwendung von Materialien. Da ein Großteil der Gebäude in Subsahara-Afrika erst noch entstehen wird, besteht die Chance, kostspielige Nachrüstungen zu vermeiden – vorausgesetzt, dies geht mit notwendigen Veränderungen im Bausektor des Globalen Nordens einher.

Die Umstellung auf CO2-armen Beton kann diese Herausforderungen nur teilweise adressieren: die Bereitstellung von Wohnraum und die Dekarbonisierung des Bauwesens. LC3 erfordert nur minimale Anpassungen in Zementfabriken und wird wie herkömmlicher Beton verarbeitet. Modellrechnungen zeigen, dass sich das Material insbesondere für mehrstöckige Gebäude eignet, wo sein CO2-Fußabdruck geringer ist als der einer Kombination aus biobasierten Materialien und gebrannten Tonziegeln. Für diese Gebäudetypen ist LC3 daher sinnvoll. Viele Häuser in Subsahara-Afrika sind jedoch einstöckig, auch in Zukunft. Die Emissionen hängen also in hohem Maße von der Materialzusammensetzung und den Transportwegen ab.

Hier kommen biobasierte Materialien ins Spiel. Bislang werden sie unterschätzt, obwohl sie alle drei Herausforderungen zugleich adressieren können. Verbesserte Lehmziegel, Holz oder Bambus sind kostengünstig und arbeitsintensiver als LC3. Sie schaffen lokale Wertschöpfung, fördern kleine und mittlere Unternehmen und reduzieren Transportkosten, da sie vor Ort produziert werden können. Für den sozialen Wohnungsbau sind sie besonders geeignet: Studien aus Ruanda zeigen, dass die Wandbaukosten um 60 % oder mehr sinken können – durch verbesserte Produktionsstandards auch ohne Einbußen bei Stabilität und Haltbarkeit. Unsere Untersuchungen zeigen zudem, dass biobasierte Materialien in Kigali umweltfreundlichere und bessere Arbeitsplätze schaffen können. Eine flächendeckende Einführung scheitert bislang an Hindernissen auf Angebots- und Nachfrageseite, darunter geringes Bewusstsein sowie die Wahrnehmung mangelnder Qualität, die den Zugang zu Finanzierung erschweren.

Daraus ergibt sich ein klar zu definierender hybrider Ansatz: LC3 für mehrstöckige Gebäude und tragende Konstruktionen sowie biobasierte Materialien für einstöckige Wohnhäuser und nichttragende Innenwände, wo diese oft günstiger und lokal besser geeignet sind. In Ruanda muss die Regierung klare Vorgaben machen, damit Unternehmen auf diese Materialien umstellen. Ähnliche hybride Ansätze sind in ganz Subsahara-Afrika vielversprechend, doch die Anwendung biobasierter Materialien erfordert lokal verankerte Forschung. Geeignete Materialien hängen ab von a) der Art des Bodens und den lokal verfügbaren Materialien, b) der Importabhängigkeit bei Zement, Stahl usw. sowie c) den Transport- und Lebenszykluskosten. Nachhaltiges Holz und Myzel mögen für Europa geeignet sein, Bambus für Asien, während in Subsahara-Afrika stabilisierte Lehmziegel, Erd-Zement-Mischungen und Pflanzen wie Rohrkolben ein großes Potenzial bieten.

Die deutsche Entwicklungszusammenarbeit sollte die wirtschaftlichen Zusatznutzen und das Entwicklungspotenzial für lokale Unternehmen, die mit biobasierten Materialien arbeiten, international stärker hervorheben. In der eigenen Projektarbeit sollte nachhaltigeres Bauen als Ziel verankert werden, einschließlich der Nutzung biobasierter Materialien zur Schaffung grüner Arbeitsplätze. Die konkreten biobasierten Materialien und die zu unterstützenden Wertschöpfungsketten müssen im Vorfeld für jedes Land sorgfältig analysiert werden, insbesondere hinsichtlich Verfügbarkeit und Qualität von Erde, der Import-Export-Struktur und Zölle für Baumaterialien, der Marktbedingungen sowie Engpässe auf Angebots- und Nachfrageseite. Gleichzeitig erfordert die Anwendung biobasierter Materialien politischen Willen vor Ort, um sich gegen Interessen im Bausektor durchzusetzen, sowie klare staatliche Vorgaben, die Orientierung bieten und gleiche Wettbewerbsbedingungen für nachhaltige Alternativen schaffen. Dieser Weg mag langsamer erscheinen als andere Lösungen, ist jedoch realisierbar und dürfte den wirtschaftlichen Nutzen für die Partnerländer erhöhen.

Coasts, deltas and estuaries have been reshaped for generations by land reclamation projects for the purposes of expanding settlements and agricultural lands as well as protecting coasts. Since the mid-twentieth century, technical progress has allowed for land reclamation to occur at an unprecedented speed and scale. Regardless of the key role that land reclamation has had in the past as well as in more recent coastal urbanisation efforts, the issue has received insufficient attention from human geographers, urban political ecologists and marine social scientists. In this paper, I aim to advance the land reclamation research by suggesting a new conceptual framework that combines concepts and empirical insights from urban political ecology (UPE), anthropology, political geography and political economy. This approach considers the representational, legal and material dimensions of urban coastal mega-projects and helps to identify those who benefit and those who lose due to land reclamation. I conclude that a focus on land reclamation can help to understand that ‘land’ is a fundamental requirement for urbanisation. Land in coastal cities is not ‘out there’; it has to be created. To investigate the making of land requires integrating the often-neglected coastal geomorphologies, marine sites of sediment extraction and understanding how they are discursively shaped and transformed by human interventions on urban coasts into UPE.

Die internationale Ordnung ist in einem tiefgreifenden Wandel, wobei Großmachtrivalitäten eine Neu-ordnung globaler Machtstrukturen vorantreiben. Dies hat auch Auswirkungen auf die europäische Entwicklungspolitik. In vielen EU-Mitgliedstaaten gehen die Mittel für öffentliche Entwicklungszusammenarbeit (ODA) zurück; gleichzeitig richten EU-Länder ihre verbleibenden Mittel stärker an Eigeninteressen aus. Bislang werden diese Reformen weitestgehend bilateral ausdefiniert, wohingegen eine politische Debatte über Rolle, Mehrwert und gemeinsame Ausgestaltung der EU-Entwicklungspolitik weitestgehend fehlt. Doch ohne eine Stärkung der europäischen Zusammenarbeit wird es Europa nicht gelingen, auf die aktuellen weltpolitischen Umbrüche eine adäquate Antwort zu geben.
In diesem Policy Brief argumentieren wir, dass Reformbestrebungen in der europäischen Entwick-lungspolitik die Zusammenarbeit und Komplementarität stärken müssen, um wirksam auf die veränderte geopolitische Lage reagieren zu können. Unsere Analyse zeigt vier inhaltliche Handlungsfelder, auf die sich laufende Reformprozesse europäischer Akteure konzentrieren und auf denen Entwicklungspolitik wichtige Beiträge leisten soll:
1. Wirtschaftsförderung und Einbindung des Privatsektors; 2. Sicherheitspolitik; 3. Steuerung und Gestaltung von Migration; 4. Menschliche Entwicklung und Armutsreduktion, insbesondere in LDCs (Least Developed Countries).
Eine gemeinsame strategische Ausrichtung Europas auf diesen Handlungsfeldern fehlt jedoch bisher. Diese gemeinsamen strategischen Prioritäten auszuhandeln erfordert eine Neubelebung des politischen Dialogs zwischen EU-Institutionen und Mit-gliedstaaten sowie eine Weiterentwicklung des „Team Europe“-Ansatzes. „Team Europe 2.0“ hätte dann zwei Funktionen: die inhaltliche Komplementarität „nach innen“ zu stärken durch eine Verständigung darauf, wie die unterschiedlichen Akteure jeweils zu gemeinsam festgelegten Zielsetzungen beitragen; und „nach außen“, um sichtbar zu machen, wofür Europa strategisch steht.
Kernelement von Team Europe 2.0 sollte ein verbesserter inhaltlicher Austausch in themenspezifi-schen, informellen Gruppen unter Führung einzelner Mitgliedstaaten und der Kommission sein. Solche „thematischen Champions“ könnten die Entwicklung gemeinsamer Strategien für größere, transformative Initiativen erleichtern. Ein verbesserter politischer Dialog und inhaltliche Abstimmung in Schlüsselbe-reichen der europäischen Entwicklungspolitik sind Voraussetzungen für ein geeintes und strategischeres Auftreten von „Team Europe“ nach außen, auch in multilateralen Kontexten.

The international order is undergoing profound change as rivalry among major powers realigns the global balance. This is also having an impact on European development policy. In many European Union (EU) member states, funding for official development assistance (ODA) is declining. At the same time, EU countries are reforming their development policies and increasingly channelling their remaining resources towards priorities that serve primarily their own interests. So far, these reforms have largely been defined bilaterally, whereas a political debate on the role, added value and joint objectives of EU development policy is largely absent. Yet, without strengthening European cooperation in development policy, Europe will not succeed in providing an adequate response to the current upheavals in global politics.
In this policy brief, we argue that reform efforts in European development policy must strengthen co-operation and complementarity to respond effectively to the changed geopolitical landscape. Our analysis identifies four key policy areas where European actors are pursuing ongoing reforms and where development policy should make significant contributions: 
1) promoting economic cooperation and private-sector engagement, 2) security policy, 3) managing and shaping migration and 4) human development including poverty reduction, particularly in least developed countries (LDCs). So far, a joint European strategic direction in these areas has been lacking. Negotiating these shared priorities requires a revitalisation of the political dialogue between EU institutions and member states, as well as further development of the “Team Europe” approach. “Team Europe 2.0” would then have two functions: to strengthen substantive complementarity “internally” through an understanding of how the various actors individually contribute to jointly defined objectives; and “externally” by making visible what Europe stands for strategically.
A key element of Team Europe 2.0 should be an improved substantive dialogue among member states and within issue-specific, informal groups co-facilitated by individual member states and the European Commission. Such “thematic champions” could initiate the development of joint strategies for larger, transformative initiatives. Improved political dialogue and coordination on substance in key areas of European development policy are prerequisites for a united and more strategic external presence of “Team Europe”, including in multilateral contexts.

 

 

The international order is undergoing profound change as rivalry among major powers realigns the global balance. This is also having an impact on European development policy. In many European Union (EU) member states, funding for official development assistance (ODA) is declining. At the same time, EU countries are reforming their development policies and increasingly channelling their remaining resources towards priorities that serve primarily their own interests. So far, these reforms have largely been defined bilaterally, whereas a political debate on the role, added value and joint objectives of EU development policy is largely absent. Yet, without strengthening European cooperation in development policy, Europe will not succeed in providing an adequate response to the current upheavals in global politics.
In this policy brief, we argue that reform efforts in European development policy must strengthen co-operation and complementarity to respond effectively to the changed geopolitical landscape. Our analysis identifies four key policy areas where European actors are pursuing ongoing reforms and where development policy should make significant contributions: 
1) promoting economic cooperation and private-sector engagement, 2) security policy, 3) managing and shaping migration and 4) human development including poverty reduction, particularly in least developed countries (LDCs). So far, a joint European strategic direction in these areas has been lacking. Negotiating these shared priorities requires a revitalisation of the political dialogue between EU institutions and member states, as well as further development of the “Team Europe” approach. “Team Europe 2.0” would then have two functions: to strengthen substantive complementarity “internally” through an understanding of how the various actors individually contribute to jointly defined objectives; and “externally” by making visible what Europe stands for strategically.
A key element of Team Europe 2.0 should be an improved substantive dialogue among member states and within issue-specific, informal groups co-facilitated by individual member states and the European Commission. Such “thematic champions” could initiate the development of joint strategies for larger, transformative initiatives. Improved political dialogue and coordination on substance in key areas of European development policy are prerequisites for a united and more strategic external presence of “Team Europe”, including in multilateral contexts.

 

 

Credit: Rajesh Jantilal/AFP

By Andrew Firmin
LONDON, Apr 20 2026 (IPS)

On 7 April, the government of Cameroon published a list of 16 of its citizens confirmed killed fighting for Russia against Ukraine. That means the number of Cameroon citizens killed in this distant war has likely surpassed a hundred, making the country the biggest victim of a Russian recruitment drive increasingly focused on Africa.

Conflict attrition

When Vladimir Putin launched Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, he probably assumed the war would be over in days. But now it has ground on past the four-year mark, and Russia’s tactics have brought horrendous loss of life on both sides. Putin treats his soldiers’ lives as disposable, throwing wave after wave of troops at Ukrainian lines in what have been called ‘meat grinder’ assaults. Amid pervasive disinformation, casualty estimates vary widely. A project to count confirmed deaths puts Russian military fatalities at over 206,000, while some estimates reach 1.3 million. Russia is reportedly losing soldiers faster than it can replace them.

Putin has turned to North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un: since 2024, North Korean forces have been fighting alongside Russian troops. Over 20,000 have been deployed, with a reported 6,000 casualties. Russia has also recruited from Central Asian countries and long-term allies such as Cuba. Ukraine too has brought in thousands of foreign fighters, including Colombian mercenaries. Now Russia is increasingly turning to Africa.

Russia’s African strategy

Putin has spent years cultivating relationships with African states, helping Russia resist international isolation and counter pressure from western states. The military relationship has been two-way: Russian mercenaries from the shadowy Wagner Group, now closely controlled by the government, have been deployed in as many as 18 African countries, including Burkina Faso, the Central African Republic and Mali. In some, they fight alongside government forces against insurgent groups; in others, including Libya, where two rival governments contest power, and Sudan, home to a brutal civil war, they’re backing one of two sides fighting for power. Wherever they operate, Russian mercenaries are accused of committing atrocities.

Russia’s arrival has come with some public support, cast as an alternative to the former colonial power France and promising more equal partnerships. When Wagner forces entered Mali in 2022, crowds lined the roads to greet them, waving Russian flags. Extensive pro-Russia disinformation campaigns typically precede Russia’s military involvement, laying the groundwork for such welcomes.

The relationship is extractive: in return for soldiers, Russia typically receives natural resources, including diamonds and gold, which help sustain a war that, despite Russia’s anti-imperialist posturing in Africa, is fundamentally imperial.

Repressive Central and West African governments, several run by military juntas or former army leaders who’ve traded their uniforms for civilian clothes, value a partner with no interest in scrutinising their human rights performance. Civil society organisations and media that try to expose human rights abuses by Russian forces come under attack.

From Africa to the frontlines

Russia is now exploiting the economic insecurity of many young African men, recruiting them to serve – and possibly die – on the Ukrainian front. Extensive recent civil society research has verified that Russia has so far recruited 1,417 African nationals, with the true figure almost certainly higher. The numbers have increased year on year, indicating a systematic plan. Egypt has supplied the most recruits, followed by Cameroon and Ghana. Of 1,417 verified recruits, 316, 22 per cent, have reportedly been killed.

Some recruits have expressed support for Russia online. Others are attracted by the promise of Russian citizenship and wages that far exceed anything they could earn at home. They may compare Russia’s apparent openness, signalled by its recent relaxation of visa requirements, with Europe’s increasing hostility towards migrants.

Others who’ve managed to escape report being conned. Fake job adverts made them believe they were signing up for civilian or support roles, including jobs as plumbers and security guards. On arrival, recruits are forced sign Russian-language contracts they can’t read, given minimal training and dispatched to the frontlines. The average service length of those killed is just six months, evidence that Russia treats them as expendable.

Intermediaries – including social media influencers who promote recruitment, travel agencies and people trafficking networks – are profiting from supplying recruits. In a bizarre political twist, Duduzile Zuma-Sambudla, a daughter of former South African president Jacob Zuma, is among those accused of recruiting Africans, including some falsely told they’d be trained as bodyguards for her father’s party. In December, South African police arrested five people on charges related to the recruitment of South Africans, including a journalist known for spreading pro-Russia propaganda.

Pressure for accountability

As evidence has accumulated, several African governments have taken action. The government of Togo warned its citizens about the dangers and, when several Togolese soldiers were captured in Ukraine, confirmed they’d been lured there by false promises of jobs and educational opportunities. Last year, the government of Botswana announced it was investigating the cases of two young men who believed they were signing up for a short-term military training programme but were forced to fight. In February, Ghana’s foreign minister confirmed that at least 55 of his country’s citizens had been killed and travelled to Ukraine to seek the release of Ghanaian prisoners of war. Police in Kenya and South African have arrested people trafficking gangs and closed down recruitment agencies. The Kenyan government recently announced Russia had agreed to stop recruiting Kenyan citizens, offering evidence that sustained bilateral pressure can produce results.

But many other African governments remain in denial, placing warm relations with Russia above the lives of their citizens. By doing so, they’re making clear that those lives are as disposable to them as they are to Russia.

Far more states must press Russia to end its abusive recruitment practices. And for international partners who claim to care about the welfare of young Africans, there’s a clear starting point: help address the economic conditions that create a ready pool of desperate recruits and drop the hostile migration policies that make Russia, of all places, look like a desirable destination.

Andrew Firmin is CIVICUS Editor-in-Chief, co-director and writer for CIVICUS Lens and co-author of the State of Civil Society Report.

For interviews or more information, please contact research@civicus.org

 

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Les autorités de la république sécessionniste de Transnistrie rejettent fermement le projet d'intégration économique proposé par le gouvernement central de Moldavie. Moscou essaye de revenir dans le jeu en invoquant le format de négociation « 5+2 ».

- Le fil de l'Info / Moldavie, Relations régionales, Courrier des Balkans, Transnistrie

UNDP collaborations have shown what is possible when satellite data and recovery planning work together. Credit: UNDP

By Mukul Bhola and Devanand Ramiah
UNITED NATIONS, Apr 20 2026 (IPS)

We are stuck in response mode. But what good is an ambulance without a hospital?

Climate shocks are intensifying. Conflict is at record levels. Economies are fragile. Humanitarian appeals grow larger each year, while donor countries prioritise domestic and security concerns. One emergency follows another. Recovery slips further out of reach.

For years, the logic was straightforward: first save lives, then rebuild them. But in an era of overlapping shocks, that division is costly. By the time recovery begins, families have sold livestock, businesses have closed, children have left school, and local institutions are weaker than before. Crisis becomes the default condition.

If we want fewer protracted emergencies, recovery must start on day one.

The first 48 hours after a crisis are decisive. When authorities know which roads are blocked, which clinics are damaged, which markets are underwater, they can act immediately. Debris can be cleared before trade stalls. Water systems can be repaired before disease spreads. Small enterprises can reopen before savings disappear.

Until recently, a major obstacle was the speed and reliability of information. Governments were often forced to plan with fragmented or delayed data. Damage figures arrived weeks late. Assessments overlapped. Resources were deployed based on rough estimates rather than solid evidence.

That constraint is rapidly diminishing.

In Burundi after storms damaged thousands of homes, a rapid assessment measured losses to farms, houses, public infrastructure and businesses. Credit: UNDP Burundi

In recent years, collaboration between UNDP and the United Nations Satellite Centre, hosted at United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR), has shown what is possible when satellite data and recovery planning work together.

High-resolution imagery can now identify damaged buildings within days. Follow-up checks on the ground turn those findings into clear estimates of debris, lost livelihoods, disrupted services and the cost of rebuilding.

This is not simply faster mapping. It is a coordinated process: rapid satellite images, quick damage analysis, ground checks and immediate use of the results to guide recovery priorities and investment decisions.

In Colombia after widespread flooding, ground teams confirmed crop losses and blocked river transport, allowing recovery efforts to begin. Credit: UNDP Colombia

In Jamaica, when Hurricane Melissa struck in 2025, satellite images quickly showed the extent of the damage. Recovery teams used that information to estimate debris and plan its removal, reopening transport routes and clearing the way for reconstruction.

In Colombia’s 2024 rainy season, intensified by Tropical Storm Rafael, radar images revealed widespread flooding in Chocó and La Guajira. Ground teams confirmed crop losses and blocked river transport, allowing recovery efforts to begin before more families were forced to move.

Credit: UNDP Jamaica

After El Niño-driven storms, floods and landslides displaced hundreds of thousands in Burundi and damaged thousands of homes, a rapid assessment measured losses to farms, houses, public infrastructure and businesses. Those estimates helped set national recovery priorities and supported early talks with funders.

The pattern is consistent: when impact data arrives early, recovery decisions improve, creating the conditions for crises to shorten. Technology alone does not achieve this. Institutions that can operationalize evidence do.

The technology continues to improve. With stronger collaboration, credible estimates of physical damage and economic impact can now often be produced within 48 hours. Obstacles remain, including imagery access, weather and capacity constraints, but progress is unmistakable.

The financing architecture, however, still reflects the older reality. Emergency funding is designed to move quickly. Recovery financing often requires additional assessments, new appeals or prolonged negotiations. The result is a predictable lag between knowing the damage and investing in repair.

That lag is no longer defensible. When development actors and satellite analysts produce validated impact estimates within days, financing decisions should align with that speed.

Breaking the cycle of repeated emergency appeals will require more than improved analysis. It will require donors and institutions to treat early recovery as integral to response and to align financing with the pace of evidence.

In an age of permanent crisis, responding sequentially is a luxury the system can no longer afford. The first 48 hours should not only save lives. They should set recovery in motion.

Mukul Bhola is Director, United Nations Satellite Centre, UNITAR; Devanand Ramiah is Director of Crisis Readiness, Response and Recovery, UNDP

IPS UN Bureau

 

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Le pari est presque gagné pour l'ancien président Roumen Radev. Sa formation Bulgarie progressiste arrive très largement en tête des législatives de ce dimanche en Bulgarie, avec près de 45 % des suffrages. Reste à savoir avec qui l'ancien général de l'armée de l'air s'alliera pour former une majorité.

- Le fil de l'Info / Politique, Bulgarie, GERB, Courrier des Balkans

Le vétéran Goran Samardžić avait salué avec émotion, il y a un an, les étudiants de Novi Pazar en lutte contre le régime Vučić. Dans sa jeunesse, il s'était pourtant engagé dans l'armée serbe « pour se battre contre les Turcs » en Bosnie-Herzégovine. Portrait d'un homme qui a changé et se bat désormais pour la réconciliation.

- Articles / Serbie, Politique, Personnalités, Vucic, Courrier des Balkans

Le vétéran Goran Samardžić avait salué avec émotion, il y a un an, les étudiants de Novi Pazar en lutte contre le régime Vučić. Dans sa jeunesse, il s'était pourtant engagé dans l'armée serbe « pour se battre contre les Turcs » en Bosnie-Herzégovine. Portrait d'un homme qui a changé et se bat désormais pour la réconciliation.

- Articles / Serbie, Politique, Une - Diaporama, Personnalités, Vucic, Courrier des Balkans

Le Tour de Bosnie-Herzégovine est parti vendredi de Sarajevo. Cette première course cycliste professionnelle réunit 175 coureurs de 38 pays sur un parcours de trois étapes entre Sarajevo et Neum. Un événement qui vise à renforcer la visibilité du pays et à valoriser son potentiel touristique.

- Le fil de l'Info / Bosnie-Herzégovine, Sports, Tourisme balkans, Courrier des Balkans

Le Tour de Bosnie-Herzégovine est parti vendredi de Sarajevo. Cette première course cycliste professionnelle réunit 175 coureurs de 38 pays sur un parcours de trois étapes entre Sarajevo et Neum. Un événement qui vise à renforcer la visibilité du pays et à valoriser son potentiel touristique.

- Articles / Une - Diaporama - En premier, Une - Diaporama, Bosnie-Herzégovine, Sports, Tourisme balkans, Courrier des Balkans