Union européenne

Son principal atout est un « sens de l'ego plutôt limité », a déclaré un diplomate européen

The post Bruxelles mise sur l’humilité de Rutte pour apaiser les tensions transatlantiques appeared first on Euractiv FR.

Qu'il soit admiré comme le défenseur de la civilisation chrétienne ou condamné comme un perturbateur illibéral, Viktor Orbán est l'un des hommes politiques européens les plus influents de son époque

The post PROFIL : Orbán, le conservateur radical et clivant qui a refaçonné la politique européenne appeared first on Euractiv FR.

The European Union (EU) and southern Medi-terranean partners launched the Pact for the Mediter-ranean in November 2025 to reset relations with the EU’s “Southern Neighbourhood” in an increasingly challenging regional context. The Pact comes 30 years after the 1995 Barcelona Process promised to foster economic – and to a lesser degree political – integration in the Mediterranean Basin. The Pact’s declared objective is to “achieve deeper integration within the common Mediterranean space” (EC & HR, 2025). This policy brief discusses the Pact’s prospects for achieving this goal, which previous efforts have failed to reach. For long-time observers of Euro-Mediterranean rela-tions, the Pact appears to be a “back to the future” approach. Its three substantive “pillars” (people, econo-mies and security) echo the three “baskets” (political/ security, economic and socio-cultural) of the original Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. Structurally, it relies on the same mix of differentiated bilateral agreements (now termed “comprehensive partnerships”) within a multilateral regional framework. The Pact’s success depends on whether the EU and Mediterranean partner countries can resolve four core dilemmas that have long challenged their relations:
• The “autocracy dilemma”: balancing the need to work with authoritarian governments with European interests in supporting democracy.
• The “migration dilemma”: securing borders while respecting human rights.
• The “rentierism dilemma”: finding solutions to immediate economic, social and environmental challenges while making necessary reforms to rentier political economies.
• The “regionalism dilemma”: cutting bilateral deals while trying to build regional structures to address collective action problems.
The term “pact” is normally used to describe an agree-ment between two partners, setting out agreed objec-tives and actions for both sides. The Pact for the Mediterranean is an EU policy framework that, at most, represents a tacit agreement with southern Mediter-ranean governments, without committing either side to policy changes or reforms that might have long-term implications. The Pact for the Mediterranean has potential to strengthen sectoral cooperation, for example on renew-able energy, connectivity infrastructure and labour mobility. If accompanied by sufficient resources and mutual trust-building, this functional cooperation may create incentives for deeper integration. This, in turn, will still depend on whether the EU and southern Mediterranean governments can move beyond trans-actionalism and invest in partnerships between their societies: support for democratic movements and institutions, investment in public goods, protection of the natural environment and investment in collective regionalism. Thus far, there is little indication that the EU and southern Mediterranean governments will take advantage of this opportunity.

The European Union (EU) and southern Medi-terranean partners launched the Pact for the Mediter-ranean in November 2025 to reset relations with the EU’s “Southern Neighbourhood” in an increasingly challenging regional context. The Pact comes 30 years after the 1995 Barcelona Process promised to foster economic – and to a lesser degree political – integration in the Mediterranean Basin. The Pact’s declared objective is to “achieve deeper integration within the common Mediterranean space” (EC & HR, 2025). This policy brief discusses the Pact’s prospects for achieving this goal, which previous efforts have failed to reach. For long-time observers of Euro-Mediterranean rela-tions, the Pact appears to be a “back to the future” approach. Its three substantive “pillars” (people, econo-mies and security) echo the three “baskets” (political/ security, economic and socio-cultural) of the original Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. Structurally, it relies on the same mix of differentiated bilateral agreements (now termed “comprehensive partnerships”) within a multilateral regional framework. The Pact’s success depends on whether the EU and Mediterranean partner countries can resolve four core dilemmas that have long challenged their relations:
• The “autocracy dilemma”: balancing the need to work with authoritarian governments with European interests in supporting democracy.
• The “migration dilemma”: securing borders while respecting human rights.
• The “rentierism dilemma”: finding solutions to immediate economic, social and environmental challenges while making necessary reforms to rentier political economies.
• The “regionalism dilemma”: cutting bilateral deals while trying to build regional structures to address collective action problems.
The term “pact” is normally used to describe an agree-ment between two partners, setting out agreed objec-tives and actions for both sides. The Pact for the Mediterranean is an EU policy framework that, at most, represents a tacit agreement with southern Mediter-ranean governments, without committing either side to policy changes or reforms that might have long-term implications. The Pact for the Mediterranean has potential to strengthen sectoral cooperation, for example on renew-able energy, connectivity infrastructure and labour mobility. If accompanied by sufficient resources and mutual trust-building, this functional cooperation may create incentives for deeper integration. This, in turn, will still depend on whether the EU and southern Mediterranean governments can move beyond trans-actionalism and invest in partnerships between their societies: support for democratic movements and institutions, investment in public goods, protection of the natural environment and investment in collective regionalism. Thus far, there is little indication that the EU and southern Mediterranean governments will take advantage of this opportunity.

The European Union (EU) and southern Medi-terranean partners launched the Pact for the Mediter-ranean in November 2025 to reset relations with the EU’s “Southern Neighbourhood” in an increasingly challenging regional context. The Pact comes 30 years after the 1995 Barcelona Process promised to foster economic – and to a lesser degree political – integration in the Mediterranean Basin. The Pact’s declared objective is to “achieve deeper integration within the common Mediterranean space” (EC & HR, 2025). This policy brief discusses the Pact’s prospects for achieving this goal, which previous efforts have failed to reach. For long-time observers of Euro-Mediterranean rela-tions, the Pact appears to be a “back to the future” approach. Its three substantive “pillars” (people, econo-mies and security) echo the three “baskets” (political/ security, economic and socio-cultural) of the original Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. Structurally, it relies on the same mix of differentiated bilateral agreements (now termed “comprehensive partnerships”) within a multilateral regional framework. The Pact’s success depends on whether the EU and Mediterranean partner countries can resolve four core dilemmas that have long challenged their relations:
• The “autocracy dilemma”: balancing the need to work with authoritarian governments with European interests in supporting democracy.
• The “migration dilemma”: securing borders while respecting human rights.
• The “rentierism dilemma”: finding solutions to immediate economic, social and environmental challenges while making necessary reforms to rentier political economies.
• The “regionalism dilemma”: cutting bilateral deals while trying to build regional structures to address collective action problems.
The term “pact” is normally used to describe an agree-ment between two partners, setting out agreed objec-tives and actions for both sides. The Pact for the Mediterranean is an EU policy framework that, at most, represents a tacit agreement with southern Mediter-ranean governments, without committing either side to policy changes or reforms that might have long-term implications. The Pact for the Mediterranean has potential to strengthen sectoral cooperation, for example on renew-able energy, connectivity infrastructure and labour mobility. If accompanied by sufficient resources and mutual trust-building, this functional cooperation may create incentives for deeper integration. This, in turn, will still depend on whether the EU and southern Mediterranean governments can move beyond trans-actionalism and invest in partnerships between their societies: support for democratic movements and institutions, investment in public goods, protection of the natural environment and investment in collective regionalism. Thus far, there is little indication that the EU and southern Mediterranean governments will take advantage of this opportunity.

Également dans l'édition de jeudi : l'Iran, Frontex, UE-Chine, la Hongrie, du café, l'OTAN

The post Orbán et la fin de l’histoire appeared first on Euractiv FR.

La schadenfreude de l'Europe face à l'échec de Trump à provoquer un changement de régime en Iran est aussi imprudente que prématurée

The post Analyse : Iran, une trêve au goût d’incertitude appeared first on Euractiv FR.

Le mandat de Rutte « ne s'étend pas à l'imposition aux Européens de toute question sur laquelle ils n'ont pas été consultés. », a déclaré un diplomate de l’OTAN

The post La « daddy diplomacy » de Rutte s’essouffle, même après le recul de Trump sur l’Iran appeared first on Euractiv FR.

« Cela offre une occasion indispensable d’apaiser les menaces, de mettre fin aux tirs de missiles, de relancer le transport maritime et de créer un espace pour la diplomatie en vue d’un accord durable »

The post L’UE salue un cessez-le-feu in extremis en Iran appeared first on Euractiv FR.

La CES presse l’UE de prendre des mesures d’urgence pour préserver les moyens de subsistance et l’industrie

The post Les ménages confrontés à des factures d’énergie « dévastatrices » à cause de la guerre en Iran appeared first on Euractiv FR.

The Transport Committee has backed digital vehicle registration certificates and compulsory sharing of mileage data and inspection results, to cut red tape and combat fraud.
Committee on Transport and Tourism

Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

L'ancien vice-président de la Commission est chargé de redresser un secteur ravagé par les scandales

The post Schinas sur la sellette : parviendra-t-il à rétablir la confiance dans l’agriculture grecque ? appeared first on Euractiv FR.

Les Conservateurs et Réformistes européens « partent à la chasse » pour attirer plus de membres que les Patriotes

The post Orbán sous pression à Bruxelles comme à Budapest appeared first on Euractiv FR.

Les interrogations se multiplient sur les instigateurs du projet et son rôle potentiel à l'approche des élections législatives en Pologne

The post Un média américain d’extrême droite débarque en Pologne appeared first on Euractiv FR.

Également dans l'édition de mercredi : l'Iran, la rencontre entre Rutte et Trump, les factures d'énergie, CRE versus Orbán, Vance, les chevaux

The post Schinas et l’art de vivre à la grecque appeared first on Euractiv FR.

Fabienne und Gilles I. wurden beim Brand in Crans-Montana schwer verletzt. Jetzt fordert die ganze Familie insgesamt 56 Millionen Franken Schadensersatz von den Verantwortlichen. Ist das realistisch? Ein Experte ordnet ein und sagt: teuer wird es allemal.

Am Dienstagnachmittag kam es im Kreis 7 zu einer Kollision zwischen einem Lastwagen und einer Fussgängerin. Die Frau erlitt schwere Verletzungen. Die Stadtpolizei Zürich sucht Zeugen.

Es ist die Nachricht, auf die viele Gottéron-Fans gewartet haben: Gemäss Trainer Roger Rönnberg haben die Ärzte grünes Licht für das Comeback von Marcus Sörensen gegeben.

Stan Wawrinka gab nach dem Aus in Monte-Carlo seine Pläne für den Rest den Jahres – und gleichzeitig seiner Karriere – bekannt. Ob es zum grossen Finale in Basel im Oktober kommt, ist noch nicht klar.

Die Rega war über Ostern 2026 im Dauereinsatz: Über 190 Notfälle, darunter Wintersportunfälle und Lawinen, sorgten für ein Rekordhoch. Ein Wanderer wurde am Sonntag aus der Areuse-Schlucht NE per Rettungswinde geborgen.